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Abstract
China’s stock market is the world’s youngest one and the fastest-growing one as well.
During the past decade, it has been developed with a variety of unique features, most of which
are inconsistent with the concept of a viable market economy. China’s dualist regulatory
regime has different sets of rules for domestic participants and foreign investors. For a long
period, foreign investment in the stock market was subject to severe restrictions and
effectively excluded from all market activities except in the B shares market. Fundamental
changes, however, have occurred following China’s accession to the WTO, especially in the
last two years. Now qualified foreign institutional investors (QFIIs) are allowed participate in
the market, as are foreign firms that wish to acquire Chinese enterprises including listed SOEs.
This article, after introducing China’s existing legal rules on foreign participation in the stock
market, analyzes the major legal and corporate governance obstacles facing foreign investors.
It concludes that, in order to achieve the ambition to make its stock market one of the most
successful in the world and to meet its WTO obligations, China needs to substantially improve
its regulatory and legal framework and adjust to different regulatory philosophies, including
rethinking the role of foreign investors, redefining the role and functions of government with
a view to providing institutions supporting the market, and creating real good corporate
governance for listed companies. To achieve this, the key is to accelerate privatization, which
has picked up speed in 2003.
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INTRODUCTION
Nobel laureate and economist John Hicks suggested that financial markets should
be considered as one of the causes of the surge in economic growth over the past two
centuries, claiming that “the Industrial Revolution would have been impossible without the
concurrent development of financial markets.”1 The World Bank, in its authoritative
World Development Report, confirmed the finding of Hicks and concluded that financial
development was central to economic growth and poverty reduction.2
The effective functioning of financial markets and financial systems depends upon
sound financial institutions, which include banks, insurance companies, provident and
pension funds, investment and pooled investment schemes (mutual funds), compulsory
saving schemes, and securities markets.3 Financial institutions help facilitate private and
official capital flows, channel investment and resources to their most efficient and
productive uses, encourage technological innovations, and in so doing, perform the
functions of shifting risk to those who are willing to bear it, as well as reducing the
information costs of making transactions in market economies.4

1

See HENDRIK VAN DEN BERG, ECONOMIC GROWTH AND DEVELOPMENT 290-91 (McGraw-

Hill/Irwin 2001). The rationale was that the Industrial Revolution was characterized by a sharp rise in the
use of machinery and other capital goods, which needed to be sustained by large investment. “Such
Investment in turn required the mobilization of large amount of saving, which would have been impossible
without the creation of liquid financial assets.” See id, at 291.
2

See WORLD BANK, WORLD DEVELOPMENT REPORT 2002, at 75-76 (online PDF version, available

at http://www.worldbank.org) (hereinafter WDR 2002).
3

See id, at 76.

4

See id, at 75.
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In addition to foreign direct investment (FDI), bank borrowing and lending,an d
bond issuance, developing stock markets is regarded as one of the most important
alternative funding sources, which is especially useful to developing countries including
the People’s Republic of China (China or PRC), the largest one in this group.5 As the
World Bank has noted, “as the stock market develops and strengthens, it benefits other
parts of the financial sector as well as the wider economy.”6
The world’s sixth largest and fastest growing economy,7 China has a relatively
small stock market. However, since China’s securities market is the world’s youngest one
as well, its pace of expansion is impressive. The Chinese stock market deserves
international attention by virtue of two features: First, it is the only stock market in the
world in which an overwhelming majority of listed companies are state-owned enterprises
(SOEs).8 Second, it represents one of the world’s biggest privatization movements, as
China’s SOEs have been gradually privatized through issuing stocks to private citizens and
5

See WORLD BANK, WORLD DEVELOPMENT REPORT 1999/2000, at 83 (online PDF version

available at http://www.worldbank.org) (hereinafter WDR 2000).
6

7

See id, at 84.
According to the World Development Indicators of World Bank, China’s GDP in 2002 was US$ 1,237

Billion, ranking No.6 behind USA, Japan, Germany, France, and British. See Total GNP 2002, Quick
Reference Tables of the World Development Indicators Database (2003), available at
http://www.worldbank.org/data/quickreference/quickref.html.
8

In the 1273 listed companies in China’s stock markets, only about a hundred of them are privately owned.

See the database of China’s listed companies on the website of the China Securities Regulatory Commission
(CSRC) at http://www.csrc.gov.cn. See also Li Yinyan, Wang Jue: guoqi gaige reng zai gongjian [Wang Jue
says reform of SOEs is still storming fortifications], Zhongguo Jingji Shibao [China Economic Daily](Aug.
27, 2003), available at http://www.szed.com/n/ca392383.htm.
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foreigners, in addition to other means. In other words, socialist China is embracing
capitalism through securities markets.
China’s stock market was initially launched as an effort to finance the countries
ailing SOEs and to improve their performance through public listing.9 The Chinese
population has been persuaded to commit a significant part of its savings to the securities
market.10 However, like many other developing countries, China had implemented severe
restrictions on foreign participation in its capital markets, not only in terms of foreign
portfolio investment, but also in terms of securities-related services by foreign
intermediaries. Until very recently, the Chinese practice on regulating securities markets
was very restrictive, not only bycomparison to OECD countries which have advanced
market economies but to its Asian non-OECD neighbors as well.11
It appears that the issue of foreign participation deserves a revisit in partly because
China has accepted substantial commitments for trade in services upon its accession to the
World Trade Organization (WTO) to expand the scope of operations permitted to foreign
firms and because China has taken measures to honor those commitments. Recent efforts
include the enactment of a variety of new rules allowing foreign firms to invest in the
domestic shares market, which was exclusively reserved for Chinese citizens in the past, as
well as to acquire and merge with domestic listed companies. In some areas relating to
capital markets and securities services, China bold liberalization measures exceed its
obligations undertaken under the WTO. The broader context of these efforts contains not

9

See OECD, CHINA IN THE WORLD ECONOMY 497 (2003).

10

See id.

11

See id, at 525.
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merely WTO compliance, but also a sincere recognition of the fact that enlarged foreign
participation can raise the general level of skills in the capital markets, as well as the
determination of the Chinese leadership to accelerate privatization of China’s SOEs and to
establish a market economy based on private enterprises.
Notwithstanding the recent liberalization measures, foreign institutions are still not
able to invest without limit in China’s domestic equity markets.12 In the limited areas in
which foreign involvement is allowed, foreign institutions are still effectively excluded
from taking full advantage of their legal rights literally granted by Chinese laws and
international legal instruments such as the WTO agreements, virtually because of various
barriers arising out of the swaying regulatory culture, ambiguity of laws, and poor
corporate governance of many Chinese domestic listed companies.
The objective of this article is to describe and critically analyze the existing
Chinese regulations on foreign participation in Chinese stock markets. In addition, it also
explores the prospect of further liberalization and regulatory reform of Chinese securities
regulations. Part I provides background information, introducing the basic features and the
evolution of the Chinese securities regulatory framework insofar as foreign investment is
concerned. Part II presents a comprehensive description of the legal framework
concerning foreign participation in both portfolio investment and intermediate services.
Part III examines and critically analyzes the legal barriers and de facto restrictions on
foreign participation in China’s stock market caused by the defects of the regulatory
regime as well as the lack of good corporate governance practice in China’s listed

12

The OECD points out that in all OECD countries foreign firms are now allowed to invest without limits,

although some countries make exceptions for certain “strategic” industries. See id, at 526.
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companies. In part IV, the article explores the prospects of further liberalization and
perfection of the Chinese regulatory system. The finding of this article is that, in order to
achieve the ambition to make its stock market one of the most successful in the world and
to meet its WTO obligations, China needs to substantially improve its regulatory and legal
framework and adjust to different regulatory philosophies, including rethinking the role of
foreign investors, redefining the role and functions of government with a view to providing
institutions supporting market, and creating real good corporate governance for listed
companies. China will be able to establish a securities regulatory framework consistent
with international practice. This, however, depends on the success of reform agenda in
some key areas relating to securities and corporate law.

I.

BACKGROUND: A SPINDLING STOCK MARKET
AND THE DUALIST REGULATORY REGIME

A. Evolution of the Chinese Stock Market and the Regulatory Regime
Before the early 1950s China was once the home to one of Asia’s largest stock
markets.13 During the 1940s Shanghai Securities Exchange was the largest stock exchange
13

According to a documentary book compiled by Mr. Liu Hongru, the first head of PRC’s regulatory

authority on securities market in the reform era, the first stock market in China, called the Shanghai Stock
Market [Shanghai Gufen Gongsuo], was created by foreign firms in 1869. In 1918, Japan set up the
Shanghai Securities Branch [Shanghai Quyin Suo] of the Osaka stock exchange. Stock of Chinese enterprises
was first issued in 1872 by the Shanghai General Bureau of Shipbuilding and Commerce. Two years later, in
1914, the Chinese government enacted laws to govern the Stock Exchange Market. Between 1918 and 1920,
China established three large securities markets. The securities markets were interrupted for cause of
Chinese-Japanese war broke out in 1930s and the World War II. In 1946 the Nationalist government set up
the Shanghai Securities Exchange. See Zhongguo Zhengquan Shouce [China Securities Handbook] 513-16
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in Asia and more influential and internationally supported than that of Hong Kong.14 In
1949 when the Communist Party took over the country and established the PRC, it began
to institute a centrally planned economy in mainland China and finally eliminated
securities activities together with any other private ownership in 1959.15 As a result, for
about 30 years from the 1950s to 1980s, there was no securities market at all in China.
Reintroduction of stock companies and stock market was considered in the
“Reform and Opening Up” era initiated by China’s former paramount leader Deng
Xiaoping, featuring a market-oriented reform agenda of the economic system.
Restructuring the economy generated more and more capital needs, which could not be met
by the traditional sources – collecting funds and taxes from State-owned enterprises. In
addition, fed up with the poor performance of SOEs, the Chinese leadership saw capital
markets as an alternative to construct new types of corporate entities.
(Liu Hongru ed., 1992) (cited in Andrew Xuefeng Qian, Riding Two Horses: Corporatizing Enterprises and
the Emerging of Securities Regulatory Regime in China, 12 UCLA PAC. BASIN L.J. 62, 64 & note 6-8
(1993) ).
There is, however, different historical finding as to the “first” stock exchange in China. William N. Goetzmann,
Andrey Ukhov and Ning Zhu of the Yale International Center for Finance (ICF) find that China’s first stock exchange,
named Shanghai Share Broker’s Association, was found in 1891. See William N. Goetzmann, China and the World
Financial Markets 1870-1930: Modern Lessons from Historical Globalization, Yale ICF Working Paper No. 00-62
(2001), at p. 7, online PDF version of the paper available at http://papers.ssrn.com/abstract=189139.
14

See Ann P. Vandevelde, Realizing the Re-Emergence of the Chinese Stock Market: Fact or Fiction? 30

Vand. J. Transnat’l L. 579, 583 (1997). It was noted that “Shanghai was then one of the most important
capital markets in Asia, with a strong domestic and international banking sector and a vigorous market for
domestic and foreign stocks and bonds.”
15

See Minkang Gu & Robert C. Art

Securitization of State Ownership: Chinese Securities Law, 18 Mich. J.

Int'l L. 115, 117 (1996).
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The OECD, in its recent study of the development of China’s economy,correctly
observes that the growth of the Chinese capital markets, in which the stock market has
been an indispensable part from the outset, proceeded through three stages: (i) a formative
period in the late 1970s to 1980s, (ii) the emergence of more formal structures including
stock exchanges and a regulatory regime in the early 1990s, and (iii) additional reforms
after the 1997 Asian crisis.16 The first stage was featured with informal markets in
company stocks for which initiatives, including both issuing and trading, came from
enterprises themselves or from local governments without the approval of the central
authority in Beijing.17 Many collective firms issued debentures and internal employee
shares.18 In 1984, China officially began experimenting with the idea of establishing joint
stock companies, which started in Beijing where a departmental store was given
permission to issue shares to its employees.19 The capital markets evolved more rapidly
than the government anticipated, as firms sought new ways to raise capital and residents to
invest. Government regulation of the market activities therefore came only after the fact.
At first, Beijing did not allow the bonds and stocks issued to be tradable. However,
secondary markets developed underground (which is called “black-market” by the Chinese)
despite the lack of official approval. Eventually the government acknowledged this

16

See OECD, supra note 9, at 499.

17

See id.

18

See id.

19

See SALLY A. HARPOLE, CHINA BUSINESS LAW GUIDE, ¶38-310. (1993 CCH International), and

see Xiaonian Xu and Yan Wang, Ownership Structure, Corporate Governance, and Corporate Performance:
the Case of Chinese Stock Companies, the World Bank Policy Research Working Paper No. 1794 (1997), at
p. 6, available at http://www.worldbank.org.
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practice and endorsed it with formal sanctions.20 Two stock exchanges were established in
the early 1990s, entering China’s stock market into the second stage.21 This stage, at its
early time, was contaminated by stock market “fever” which broke out in Southeast China
in 1992,22 ignited by Deng Xiaoping’s southern tour declaring that China would replace
the planned economy with the market economy and encouraging people to boldly conduct
economic experiments in every aspect of the economy irrespective of the socialistic or
capitalistic nature of economic activities.23 The fever was, however, short- lived. The
institutions, nevertheless, were gradually established in this stage. In the third stage, the
20

See DANIEL A. LAPRES & ZHANG YUEJIAO, BUSINESS LAW IN CHINA (ICC Publication No.

576), 338(1997).
21

The Shanghai Stock Exchange was opened in December 1990 and the Shenzhen Stock Exchange in April

1991. In terms of utilizing of modern computer and telecommunication technology, the two exchanges are
among the best in the world.
22

See OECD, supra note 9, at 499.

23

Deng Xiaoping said in this tour, “We should be bolder than before in conducting reform and opening to the

outside and have the courage to experiment.” In responding to someone’s fear of bold experiment would lead
to capitalism, Deng Xiaoping said, “ The chief criterion for making a judgment is should be whether it
promotes the growth of productive forces in a socialist society, increases the overall strength of the socialist
state and raises living standards.” As to repealing of the planned economy, Deng Xiaoping said, “The
proportion of planning to market forces is not the essential difference between socialism and capitalism. A
planned economy is not equivalent to socialism … a market economy is not capitalism, because there are
markets under socialism too.” As to securities markets, he said, “Are securities and the stock market good or
bad? …Are they peculiar to capitalism? Can socialism make use of them? We allow people to reserve their
judgment, but we must try these things out.” See Excepts from Talks given in Wuchang, Shenzhen, Zhuhai
and Shanghai (January 18-Feburary 21,1992), available at
http://www.peopledaily.com.cn/english/dengxp/vol13/text/dl200.html (visited Nov. 10, 1999).
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central government’s attitude towards the capital markets changed significantly in the
sense that “corporatization” was regarded as a major solution to the problems created by
SOEs for which other mechanisms turned out to be futile. In late 1996, the central
government determined that transformation of SOEs through public issuance of equity
shares as well as the stock market itself should be promoted as part of this industries
restructuring programme.24
The second and third stages were also featured with the construction of a formal
legal and regulatory framework for the securities sectors. China did not have a special
central agency to regulate securities markets until the early 1990s. At the very beginning,
overlapping authorities regulating securities surprisingly co-existed for several years.
Authorities such as People’s Bank of China, Ministry of Finance, the State Planning
Commission, the State Commission for Restructuring the Economic System, the State
Administration for Industry and Commerce, and many local governments, etc., all had
issued normsgoverning different or similar activities in the securities markets.25
Confusions and conflicts thus created finally led to the creation of a centralized market
regulatory body. The formation of the State Council Securities Committee (the “SCSC”)
and China Securities Regulatory Commission (the “CSRC”) in 1992 marked the first effort
to establish unified regulatory control over the market. The SCSC was charged with the
primary authority for market regulation. The CSRC was designed as the SCSC’s executive
organ, responsible for conducting supervision and regulation of the market in accordance

24

See OECD, supra note 9, at 499.

25

See ZHU SANZHU, SECURITIES REGULATIONS IN CHINA 8-13 (Transnational Publishers, 2000).
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with powers delegated by the SCSC.26 In April 1998, pursuant to the ambitious State
Council Reform Plan launched by Premier Zhu Rongji, the SCSC was repealed and the
CSRC became the sole ministry under the State Council charged with the duty to supervise
the securities markets. The so-called “centralized securities supervisory system” was only
achieved at that time.
China has also promulgated a good body of securities laws. Since 1987, various
authorities have released several hundreds of norms and regulations governing the issuance
and transaction of securities.27 Among those laws the most important ones are the 1993
enacted The Company Law of the People’s Republic of China (hereafter the “Company
Law”), effective on January 1, 1994, and the 1998 Securities Law of the People’s Republic
of China ( hereafter “the Securities Law”), effective on July 1, 1999. The Company Law
regulates the establishment, operation, internal management and dissolution of limited
liability companies and stock companies. In terms of securities regulations, it covers the
rights and obligations of shareholders, powers and responsibilities of directors, financial
and accounting requirements for companies, as well as corporate termination and
liquidation. The Securities Law is the primary regulation on market oversight and
operation, governing registration and public issuance of shares, secondary market
transactions, disclosure, insider trading, mergers and acquisitions, as well as thebehavior
of stock exchanges and securities firms. Supplemental to that are numerous decrees issued
by the CSRC and other authorities (such as the Ministry of Finance, Ministry of Commerce,
26

See CSRC, A Brief Introduction of China Securities Regulatory Commission, at

http://www.csrc.gov.cn/CSRCSite/eng/eabout/eintr.htm (visited 10 November 2003).
27

See Sun Jie: Zhejianhui Zhuxi Zhou Zhengqing Fangtan [Interview with CSRC Chairman Zhou Zhengqing],

in Zhongguo Zhengquan Shibao [China Securities Daily], Dec.30, 1998, at page 1.
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etc.) concerning detailed rules or specialized areas of stock market activities.

B. Special Features of China’s Stock Market
The Chinese stock market is unique among dozens of its peers in the world.
Absent of the knowledge of the key characteristics of the market, it is entirely impossible
to understand any aspect of the Chinese securities regulations, including those on foreign
investment. A recent report of Sheldon Gao, senior director of the Dow Jones Indexes,
identified fourteen key features of China’s stock market using the Dow Jones Global Index
and Dow Jones China Index as tools.28 Some of them, because of their strong relevance to
the perfection of the regulatory regime, are worth noting and discussing here.
(1) Abnormal performance: Since the inceptions of the two stock exchanges in the
early 1990s, the Chinese stock market has delivered impressive returns in most of the years
so far. The Dow Jones Report showed that, during the eight-year period from 1994
through 2001, as measured by the Dow Jones China Index consisting of 549 stocks as of
31 January 2002, China’s stock market outpaced many of the world’s leading indexes,
including the Dow Jones STOXX 600 on European markets, Hong Kong’s Hang Seng
Index, Japan’s Nikkei 225, as well as the Dow Jones World Emerging Markets Index
covering eleven emerging markets around the world.29 The performance, however, could
only be characterized as “abnormal” because it is not based on the performance of the
listed companies and the Chinese economy as well.30
28

China Stock Market in Global Perspective, Dow Jones Indexes, September 2003 (Research report by

Sheldon Gao, senior director, Dow Jones Indexes) (Hereinafter the Dow Jones Report).
29

See the Dow Jones Report, supra note 28, at 6.

30

See id. A vivid evidence is that since 2001, the Chinese stock market has been grim despite that China’s

economy has been experiencing explosive GDP growth.
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(2) Insulated market: As this article will discuss in the following part, China’s
stock market divides its shares into a variety of types.31 “Class A shares” are restricted to
domestic investors. Foreign investors originally were only allowed to buy and trade (with
restrictions) the so-called “B shares.” Only recently, a small number of investors in the
two markets have been allowed to participate in both markets.32 It is alleged that market
segregation plus the foreign exchange control regime helped China to protect its economy
against foreign harassment during the Asian financial crisis of 1997.33 However, in recent
years, the segregation is increasingly viewed as a barrier between China’s capital markets
and international investors.
(3) Substantial government ownership and low float ratio: Free float ratio,
representing a stock market’s liquidity and investability, refers to the proportion of freely
tradable shares available to investors.34 Due to widespread state ownership, the float ratio
in China’s stock market, close to 30 percent since 1993, appears to be extremely slow.35
Although things have been changing due to recent regulatory relaxations allowing foreign
investors to have greater participation in SOEs,36 in most listed companies which were
converted from SOEs, only one-third of the company’s shares are typically issued to the
public, with the rest remaining in the hands of the government, the company itself, or other

31

See infra, part I(C)(1) of this article.

32

See id.

33

See The Dow Jones Report, supra note 28, at 12.

34

See id, at 14.

35

One can appreciate the extremity of China’s stock market in float ratio by contrasting it with that of other

markets: the ratio in the U.S. is 93.9%, in Europe 78.7%, and in Japan 79.6%. See id, at 14-15.
36

See infra, part II of this article.
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state-owned companies.37 According to a Dow Jones survey, the average government
ownership in China’s stock market was 45 percent, as of 31 January 2002, with a
maximum of 89 percent. Such a high percentage of state ownership does not exist in any
other stock market in the world.38
(4) Irregular expansion primarily through IPOs: The size of a stock market
expands through either external expansion, which refers to the issuance of new shares such
as IPOs, secondary offerings and follow-up offerings, or internal growth, which is the
appreciation of existing shares.39 While in most other places in the world stock markets
expand through internal growth,40 in China the opposite has been true. Since the early
1990s, the total market value grew at an annual rate of 47.4 percent, only 16.9 percent was
contributed by an increase in the value of the existing stocks.41 In other words, almost
two- thirds of the market growth was the result of external expansion. The significance is
that the return on existing stocks is substantially weakened despite the amazing expansion
of market size.
(5) Typicalcharacteristics of emerging market embodied by confused and
restrictive regulations: Due to lack of regulatory experience, rule of law, and of fully
developed market economy, China’s stock market possesses many of the features that are
characteristics of emerging markets. First, there are too many types of shares to confuse
37

See The Dow Jones Report, supra note 28, at 15.

38

See id, at 16.

39

See id, at 17.

40

For instance, during the years from 1993 to 2001, 84% of the market growth was the result of internal

growth while only 16% came from new issuance of stocks in the U.S. stock market. See id, at 18.
41

See id.
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investors. In addition to the well-known “A shares” and “B shares”, there are several
additional classes available to global investors and denominated in free exchangeable
currencies, such as the H, N, L, and S shares listed in Hong Kong, New York, London and
Singapore, respectively.42 Secondly, initial public offerings (IPOs) are strictly regulated in
China. China is identified by the Dow Jones report as “the only country in which the
government completely controls the size of the stock market, the pace of issue and the
allocation of resources.”43 Thirdly, the market is predominated by small-cap stocks rather
than blue-chip companies, in both absolute size and in relation to the rest of the world, due
to the fact that most of China’s blue-chips are listed only on overseas exchanges and are
not available to domestic investors.44 Fourthly, the market is dominated by retail
investors.45 Institutional investors are underdeveloped in China’s stock market. Finally,
contrary to the global trend of consolidating multi exchanges of a single jurisdiction into a
single-exchange structure, China has two stock exchanges of similar size, performing
virtually the same functions on every aspect.46
(6) Pyramid structure and unusual “core”: A matured stock market is supported
by a group of blue-chip companies that acts as the “core” or backbone of the market
structure.47 Such a market “is generally shaped like a top-heavy gyroscope or funnel – a
few of these blue-chip companies may easily represent a huge chunk of the market or
42

See id, at 21.

43

See id, at 22.

44

See id, at 22.

45

See id, at 22.

46

See id, at 23.

47

See id, at 24.
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dominate the benchmark index’s movement.”48 The numerous small- cap companies, at the
bottom of the market structure, are relatively insignificant. But in China, the stock market
lacks real blue-chip stocks with high profitability and, as such, investors are overwhelmed
with small-caps.49
(7) Incredible speculation: In a developed stock market, because investors have
more confidence in the long-term economic prospects and the steady growth of corporate
profits, the turnover level, which represents the frequency of trading or the length of
holding period, is generally lower.50 Data demonstrates that the average turnover in
China’s stock market was 500 percent, indicating that an individual stock changed hands
five times a year on average.51 The average holding period is two months. By contrast, in
a mature market, the normal holding period for a stock is about two years.52 This suggests
that the spirit of speculation is extremely strong and widespread. As the Dow Jones report
observes, “The fundamental truth is that the investing environment of China’s stock market
simply does not encourage long-term investment strategies.”53
(8) Disappointing earnings of companies and low dividend yield: The
phenomenon of incredible speculation could be explained by the lack of “core” blue-chip

48

See id, at 24-25.

49

For instance, the Dow Jones report identified only one company listed in China as a large stock – Shenzhen

Development Bank, and 130 companies as mid-cap stocks. The remaining over 1,000 companies are
classified as small-cap or micro-cap companies. See id, at 22.
50

See id, at 36.

51

See id.

52

See id.

53

See id, at 37.
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companies in the market as well as by the poor performance of listed companies in terms
of making profits and distributing dividends. The fact that most companies posted low
earnings, despite the abnormal performance of the market, leads to the recognition of the
size of the bubble in China’s stock market.54 At least, it is indisputable that most stocks
are seriously overvalued.55 Cash dividend distribution, which plays a crucial role in longterm investment, appears not to be so important in the Chinese stock market, albeit the law
requires that no company could make a follow-up or secondary offering unless it pays a
cash dividend (which helps the market’s payout percentage to stay within a reasonable
range). However, China’s dividend yield (0.75 percent only) is terribly low in comparison
with the rest of the world as well as with other investment vehicles in China including the
CD rate and bond rate.56 To be sure, the low payout percentage and dividend yield are
rooted in the poor earnings of listed companies.57
In brief, as demonstrated by the above discussions, the current plight of the Chinese
stock market is marked by a number of structural flaws, of which the most important ones
are the pyramid structure58 and confusions in regulatory policies. These special features
certainly have a tremendous impact on foreign participation in China’s stock market.

C. Opening Up of China’s Stock Market and the Dualist Regulatory Regime
As noted previously, the original goal of the Chinese government for developing
securities markets was two-fold: (1) to mobilize private saving in order to finance SOEs,
54

See id, at 40.

55

See id.

56

See id, at 45.

57

See id, at 46.

58

See id, at 47.
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and (2) to improve SOE performance through public participation.59 Seemingly, foreign
participation was not conceived as needed at the outset of the development of China’s
stock market. Desires for international participation, which came from both Chinese
domestic enterprises in certain sectors that were in dire need of both foreign investment
and the legal status as listed companies and foreign investors who wished to participate in
China’s capital markets, pressed the government to create a room for foreign participation
in the stock market in the early 1990s. The opening up of the Chinese stock market started
with creating a domestic B shares market that until very recently was only available to
foreigners, followed by the construction of a parallel regulatory framework for foreign
portfolio investment, mergers and acquisitions with foreign companies, and market access
to foreign intermediaries business.
1. Chinese Classification of Stocks – All Shares Are Not Created Equal
Though both the Company Law and the Securities Law are curiously silent on the
classification of corporate stocks, it remains the most distinctive feature of Chinese
securities markets: the stock, in addition to its universal classification as common stock,
preferred stock, etc, is also defined by the status and nationality of the shareholders.60
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See OECD, supra note 9, at 497.
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types of stocks which are, most commonly, common and preferred shares. The distinction between this two
classes arises as a result of the investors’ dividend expectations, voting rights and priority in liquidation.
Apart from these differences, shareholders of each class of shares are entitled to equal rights and equal
benefits, irrespective of their origin and citizenship. See William I. Friedman, One Country, Two Systems:
The Inherent Conflict between China’s Communist Politics and Capitalist Securities Market, 27 Brook. J.
Int’l L. 477, 495 (2002).
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There are four classes of shares in China’s stock market,which include state shares, legal
person shares, A shares tradable by domestic individuals, and foreign capital shares (B
shares). The basic rationale under the class distinction is chiefly ideology-based, for the
primary purpose of controlling the transferability of different types of shares and
maintaining the leading role of government in the economy.
(1) State Shares (Guojia gu): State shares refers to shares held by central
governmental agencies, local governments, or authorized institutions on behalf of the State.
According to relevant regulations, it shall include: (i) the shares converted from the net
assets of SOEs which have been transformed into stock companies, (ii) shares initially
issued by various companies and purchased by the central or local governmental
departments investing on behalf of the State, and (3) shares initially issued by companies
and purchased by the investment companies, assets management companies, and economic
entities authorized to make investments on behalf of the State.61 State shares are not
allowed for trading on open markets such as a stock exchange or an OTC market.
Nevertheless, they can be transferred upon approval of the CSRC and the State Assets
Supervision and Administration Commission (SASAC). Sales of state shares to foreign
investors have been allowed recently as a result of a post-WTO reform programme.62
(2) Legal Person Shares (Faren gu): Referring to shares of a stock company
owned by another company or organization with a “legal person” status,63 the legal person
61

FANG Liu Fang, China’s Corporation Experiment, 5 Duke J. Comp. & Int’l L.149, 203 (1995).
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Like many other civilian jurisdictions, legal persons, under the Chinese law, are collective organizations

considered by the law as having a legal personality distinct from the natural individuals who make them up.
They are subject to the law with the attribution of legal capacity and may possess both rights and duties.
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shares can be indirectly held by the State if the shareholders are State-owned companies.64
Basically, this class includes shares held by domestic entities in which the state is the
majority owner but has not the entire ownership.65 There are four types of ownership for
legal person shares, namely, state-owned legal person shares, collective enterprise legal
person shares, private enterprise legal person shares, foreign invested enterprise legal
person shares, and institutional legal person shares. 66 Trading of legal person shares
through stock exchanges is prohibited, albeit this can be done upon case-by- case approval
from relevant authorities. Like state shares, legal person shares can be sold to foreigners
according to several laws issued after China’s accession to the WTO.67
(3) A Shares or individual shares (Geren gu): Individual shares, with an official
recognized nickname of “A shares”, refer to shares that may only be owned by Chinese
residents (including domestic institutions). A shares have the full function born by classic
stock, and can be freely traded and transferred in domestic markets. For a long time until
very recently, these shares were the only type of equity that were traded among domestic
investors at the two stock exchanges and were not accessible to foreign investors.68
(4) B Shares or Foreign Capital Shares (Waizi gu): Foreign capital shares include
B shares and overseas listing shares. B shares are shares which were originally offered

Companies, public or private entities or public bodies can become legal persons through appropriate
registration under the law.
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See FANG, supra note 61, at 204.
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exclusively to international investors. Like other shares, they are denominated in RMB,
but Chinese citizens until 2001 were not permitted to own or trade in B Shares.69
(5) Overseas listing shares: Overseas listing shares are shares issued by Chinese
companies listed on securities markets outside mainland China. Though subject to CSRC
regulations insofar as initial approval is needed for the companies to go abroad, they are
not part of the Chinese securities market but rather components of the stock markets in
which they are listed and traded. They currently include H shares, N shares, L shares and
S shares. H shares are offered by Chinese companies listed on the Hong Kong Stock
Exchange. They are subscribed for and traded in Hong Kong Dollars, and denominated in
RMB. They can only be purchased and traded by Hong Kong local investors or
international investors.70 N shares are issued to foreign investors on US stock exchanges.
Some of them are issued through IPOs but many others are denominated in RMB and
subscribed for in US dollar. Dividends are declared in RMB but paid in US dollars. As
such, many N shares are not traded directly on stock exchanges but were issued by way of
ADRs(American Depository Receipts). 71 L shares are issued on the London Stock
Exchange according a memorandum of understanding signed between U.K and China’s
relevant authorities on October 7, 1996.72 S shares are offered on the Singapore Stock
Exchange.
A typical domestically listed Chinese company normally has a mixed ownership
structure, in which each of the three major groups (state, legal persons, and individuals)
69

See infra note 89 and the accompanying text.
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holds about one third of total outstanding shares.73 The structure becomes more complex
as many companies now also issue B shares to foreigners and Chinese residents. Normally
those overseas listed Chinese companies have not yet entered into the stock market of their
home country. In any case, only one-third of the shares in state-owned companies are
tradable according to law.
2. The Dualist Regulatory System
Insulated markets, class distinctions of shares and different treatment of ownership
naturally lead to different sets of regulations on foreign and domestic investors. Since the
creation of B shares, China has promulgated numerous statutes for the separate regulation
of foreign participation in the capital markets, while domestic investors and institutions are
subject to another set of laws. Laws solely governing foreign investment will be discussed
in the following parts of this article in detail.
It is not entirely clear whether foreign investment is also subject to the various laws
supposed to be promulgated for domestic companies and transactions. In essence, the
Securities Law applies to the issuing and trading of shares, corporate bonds and other
securities “as lawfully recognized by the State Council within China.”74 Conceivably, the
law governs foreign investment-related securities such as B shares since they are “lawfully
recognized” by the central government. However, it has also to be made clear that
“specific measures in respect of shares of companies in China which are to be subscribed
and traded in foreign currencies by persons and institutions outside China shall be

73

See Xu & Wang, supra note 19, at 8.
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Securities Law, art. 2.
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separately formulated by the State Council.” 75 The implication is not that shares of
Chinese companies reserved for foreign investment (B shares) and overseas listing shares
(H shares or N shares) are to be governed entirely by a separate set of regulations made by
the State Council. Instead, regulations on foreign investment are regarded as “specific”,
“special”, or even “exceptional” measures on foreign participation, supplemental to the
major laws on securities as an entirety. For instance, the specific law on B shares
promulgated by the State Council in 1995 states clearly that the rules of the law “are
formulated in accordance with the relevant provisions of the Company Law of the People’s
Republic of China,”76 implicating that it is still within, rather than separate from, the
framework of the Company Law. Another example is the rules concerning mergers and
acquisitions. In 2002 and 2003, China has promulgated a variety of laws regulating
merger and acquisition, with a special emphasis on takeovers of Chinese companies by
foreign investors. Of the five major laws promulgated by various ministries, four are
concerned with foreign takeovers and the other two contain rules regarding takeovers and
disclosure in general, without making specific reference to purely domestic or foreignrelated transactions. However, one provision of a leading law on foreign takeover
stipulates that “transferring state shares and legal person shares to foreign investors shall

75

Id, art. 213.
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State Council on Domestically Listed Foreign Capital Shares of Stock Companies], adopted at the 37th
Executive Meeting of the State Council on Nov. 2, 1995 and promulgated by Decree No. 189 of the State
Council of the People’s Republic of China on December 25, 1995 (hereinafter the B Shares Regulations),
art.1.
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also comply with relevant CSRC rules on takeovers, disclosure, etc.”,77 thus indicating that
foreign-related transactions are subject to those general laws.
To summarize, although it is not explicitly established in the relevant laws, the
dualist nature of the Chinese securities regulatory framework shall be understood as such,
namely that regulations on foreign investment in China’s stock market serve as “special”
laws to the general framework, whose provisions shall take precedent to relevant
provisions of general laws in cases in which there is overlapping or conflict. For matters
not stipulated in foreign investment-specific laws, the provisions of general laws (such as
the Securities Law or the Takeover Measures78) shall be followed.

II.

CURRENT REGULATIONS ON FOREIGN

PARTICIPATION IN CHINA’S STOCK MARKET
As noted previously, China’s equity markets are connected to the international
markets through a variety of channels. Originally it was the B shares market accessible to
global investors. In recent years, as a result of China’s WTO commitments and
compliance efforts, foreigners have gained larger room in the capital markets as well as in
the securities services business. Recent movements include the allowance of foreign
institutional investors to buy and trade in A shares, more flexibility for takeovers of
Chinese companies by foreigners, as well as greater market access for foreign securities
business.79
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A. The B Shares Market
Coming into existence in 1991,80 the B shares market perfectly reflected the
Chinese leadership’s mixed feeling regarding the internationalization of securities markets,
namely, making use of foreign capital without shaking socialist public ownership. B
shares are governed by mainly two regulations promulgated by the State Council and the
CSRC, respectively. One is The Regulations of the State Council on Domestically Listed
Foreign Capital Shares of Stock Companies (hereinafter “the B Shares Regulations”)81,
and the other is the Implementing Rules of the Regulations of the State Council on
Domestically Listed Foreign Capital Shares of Stock Companies (hereinafter “B Shares
Implementing Rules”).82 Pursuant to the two laws, B shares present the following features
(as opposed to A shares which are similar in terms of functions to common stocks in a
Western stock company).
First, B shares are denominated in Chinese currency (Renminbi), but are subscribed
for, bought and sold in foreign currency, and listed and traded on securities exchanges in
China. 83 Dividends and other payments by the issuing company shall be calculated and
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See ZHU, supra note 25, at 127. At the inception they were officially referred to as “Renminbi tezhong

gupiao”[Renminbi special shares], nicknamed as “B shares.” See id. With the enactment of the 1995 B
Shares Regulations, both “B shares” and “jingnei shangshi waizi gu” [“domestically listed foreign capital
shares”] were used in official documents.
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declared in Renminbi but paid in foreign currency.84 Second, B shares could only be
issued to overseas investors, which, according to the Chinese definition, shall include
foreigners, natural and legal persons from Taiwan, Hong Kong and Macao, and Chinese
citizens that are residing abroad.85 Chinese in the mainland of China were not allowed to
buy and trade in B shares. Third, dividends and capital gains from B shares can be sent
abroad freely despite China’s strict foreign exchange control.86 Fourth, foreign securities
firm can serve as dealers of B shares while they were not allowed to do the business of A
shares. The two stock exchanges could enact rules to stipulate the requirements for foreign
securities firms to enter into agency agreements with Chinese partners or to act as dealers
in trading B shares.87 The first foreign securities firm invading China’s securities markets
was Morgan Stanley & Company, which established a joint venture entitled China
International Capital Corporation with China Construction Bank and several other partners
in 1995.88
Until early 2001, the B shares market was off-limits to individual and institutional
Chinese investors. This policy was changed then by a new government decree released on
21 February 2001 which allows domestic individual investors to buy and trade B shares.89
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Nevertheless, B shares are still only subscribed in foreign currency and, as such, Chinese
investors have to use the foreign exchange reserve in their banking accounts to buy those
shares.90
The original purpose for the creation of the B shares market was to open “two
windows” for the Chinese capital markets. One window was designed as a channel to help
a small number of Chinese SOEs obtain scarce foreign currency, and the other was
expected to demonstrate to foreigners China’s resolve to open up its economy.91 Despite
the poor performance of the B shares market, Chinese regulators have used many measures
to boost the market, of which the most recent one was to channel the foreign currencies
holdings of private citizens into the market. This move, unexpectedly, destructed the
original purpose underpinning the B shares regime. In fact, the B shares market has been
significantly marginalized: in the three years following the end of 2001, no single company
was approved to issue B stock in the market.92 More telling is the size of the market.
Commission and the State Administration of Foreign Exchange on Questions Regarding Investment in the B
Shares Market by Chinese Residents], CSRC Decree No. 22 (2001) (hereinafter the B Shares Circular on
Chinese Investors).
90
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Functions of and Boost the B Shares Market], in Shanghai Zhengquan Bao [Shanghai Securities Daily]
(October 31, 2003), available at http://business.sohu.com/77/72/article215027277.shtml.
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foreign institutions. This was the first approval of issuance since the end of 2001. See, shanggong gufen
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(Shanghai Securities Daily), available at http://www.stocknews.com.cn. See also ZHU Jinfu, Shanggong B
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Despite many years of development, the B shares market remains small in terms of both
the number of listed companies and market capitalization.93 The listed companies were
also regarded as too small and too risky.
In light of the fact that the A shares market is being opened to foreign investors
(albeit under limitations)94 and many Chinese companies now go directly abroad to raise
foreign capital, the logic of having a separate B shares market would be called into
question. Future priorities for development of China’s capital market should include
merging the A shares and B Shares and eliminating the class distinctions among different
types of stock.

B. Qualified Foreign Institutional Investors (QFII)
It is said that Asian countries’ liberalization of capital markets normally has gone
through three or four stages, including mainly initial permission of limited entry of foreign
capital into the market, then opening the domestic markets to foreign institutional investors,
and finally the overall liberalization of capital markets.95 Chinese regulators seemed
suddenly to spot this experience shortly after the nation joined the WTO.
The experience mainly came from Taiwan. Since 1990, in efforts to liberalize its

gu qiaokai rongzi zhi men, B gu shichang mianlian chongxin dingwei [Shanggong B Shares Opened the
Doors for Financing; B Shares Market Needs Reposition Itself], in Zhongguo Jingying Bao [China Business
Operation Daily] (Sept. 30, 2003), available at http://finance.sina.com.cn/k/20030930/0935462053.shtml.
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stock market for access to foreigners, Taiwan has begun to permit qualified foreign
institutional investors (QFIIs) to directly buy and trade in Taiwan-listed securities.96
Under the QFII regime, foreign banks, insurance companies and fund management
institutions were allowed to invest directly in securities listed in the Taiwan Securities
Exchange (TSE). QFIIs must meet certain threshold requirements, including longevity,
experience and asset.97 There were also strict requirements as to inward remittance of
foreign capital, profit repatriation, and percentage limits on QFIIs’ investment in target
companies.98
In November 2002, roughly one year before Taiwan abolished the QFII regime,99
the CSRC and People’s Bank of China (PBC), the two regulators on China’s financial
markets, jointly introduced the mainland’s QFII system in a decree titled Provisional Rules
on Administration of Domestic Securities Investment of Qualified Foreign Institutional
Investors (QFII) (hereinafter the QFII Rules).100 Effective December 1, 2002, foreign
financial institutions could apply to invest directly in China’s domestic A shares market.
The two stock exchanges both released their “Implementing Rules” regarding the
96
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application of QFII Rules in the effective date of December 1, 2002.101
The QFII Rules define “QFIIs” as “overseas asset management institutions,
insurance companies, securities companies, and other asset management institutions”
approved by the CSRC and granted foreign exchange quota for the State Administration of
Foreign Exchange (SAFE).102 Curiously enough, foreign banks are not included in the
definition, although commercial banks are mentioned in an article of the Rules concerning
asset size. In addition, it is widely understood that banks can operate in China’s QFII
system through their asset management subsidiaries.
Compared with the Taiwan QFII system, the threshold access standard for foreign
institutions is rather high in terms of their experience, asset requirements, and business
longevity. To be qualified as QFII in China, a fund management company must have
conducted fund management business for at least five years, managing asset size no less
than US$ 10 billion in the past year; an insurance company shall have conducted insurance
business for over 30 years, with actual paid-up capital of no less than US$ 1 billion and
securities assets managed in the latest fiscal year of no less than US$ 10 billion; a
securities firm shall have conducted securities business for over 30 years, with actual paidup capital of no less than US$ 1 billion and securities assets managed in the latest fiscal
year of no less than US$ 10 billion, and a commercial bank shall have its total assets
ranked among the top 100 in the world in the latest fiscal year and securities assets
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managed of no less than US$ 10 billion.103 In addition, the applicants for QFII shall have
sound corporate governance structure and internal control system, and their home
jurisdiction shall have signed Memorandum of Understanding with the CSRC for crossborder regulatory cooperation.104
A QFII can invest in A shares (but not B shares), listed government bonds,
convertible bonds, corporate bonds, and other financial instruments as approved by the
CSRC.105 However, any investment amount must not exceed the quota granted by the
SAFE.106 In addition, Shares held by each QFII in one listed company should not exceed
ten percent of total outstanding shares of the company, and total shares held by all QFIIs in
one listed company should not exceed twenty percent of total outstanding shares of the
company.107 QFIIs are also required to comply with the “Guidelines to Foreign
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Investment” issued by the State Council once a year.108
Like the Taiwanese system, one of the most prominent features of the mainland
QFII is the strict control of inflow and outflow of capital. Each QFII may only apply to
remit an amount within the quota assigned by the SAFE, which ranges from US$ 50
million to 800 million.109 However, it is not clear how many times a QFII can apply each
year.110 For capital outflow, the Rules stipulate that the principal investment shall stay in
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China for three years until it is allowed to repatriate only by installments.111 Restrictive as
it is, this provision effectively forces the investors to stay in the market, irrespective of
their market judgment. The rationale is, obviously, to limit the detrimental effect of
international “hot money” which was alleged to cause the 1997 Asian Financial Crisis.

C. Takeover by Foreign Companies (Mergers and Acquisitions)
Permission of foreign access to the mergers and acquisitions (M&A) market is
regarded as the boldest movement of the Chinese government in opening up its capital
markets and restructuring the SOEs. Out of the concern for sovereign control over the
national economy, China’s government had been very hostile toward foreign takeover of
Chinese companies, be it hostile or friendly mergers or acquisitions. The two earliest
foreign takeovers of PRC companies occurred in May 1995. One involves the acquisition
of 25 percent of the shares of Beilu Co. by two Japanese companies, and the other was the
purchase of 20 percent of the shares of Jiangling Automobile Company by Ford Motor
Company.112 The two takeovers triggered tremendous volatility in China’s stock market
and attracted the attention of Chinese regulators immediately. One month later, the
Chinese authority issued a “notice” mandating that “no unit shall be allowed to transfer
state shares and legal person shares to foreign investors until the state promulgated laws
allowing this”, although the two takeovers that had already taken place were

111

See QFII Rules, art. 26.

112

See, Binggou hui jizhong zai naxie hangye? [On what areas will foreign mergers and acquisitions focus?],

in Beijing Chenbao [Beijing Morning News](Nov. 5, 2002), available at
http://202.84.17.28/csnews/20021105/295748.asp.

35

grandfathered.113
WTO accession – and the anticipation of it – has led to dramatic changes in
Chinese regulators’ attitude towards foreign invasion into the Chinese economy through
M&As. On the contrary, as this article will discuss later on, they might now view that as
an effective way to reform China’s struggling SOEs. Since 2001, a number of regulations
and rules have been released to liberalize takeovers by foreign investors of Chinese
companies, including, mainly, SOEs. The laws include:
Several Opinions concerning Foreign Investment in Listed Companies,114 issued by
the CSRC and Ministry of Foreign Trade and Economic Cooperation (the predecessor of
Ministry of Commerce), November 2001 (hereinafter Several Opinions);
Administrative Measures on the Takeovers of Listed Companies,115 issued by the
CSRC, September 2002 (hereinafter Takeover Measures);
Circular on the Transfer of State Shares and Legal Person Shares to Foreign
Investors,116 issued by the CSRC, Ministry of Finance, and State Commission on Economy
and Trade, November 2002 (hereafter the State Shares Circular);
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Provisional Rules on Restructuring SOEs by Utilizing Foreign Investment,117
issued by Ministry of Finance, State Administration on Foreign Exchange, State Industrial
Administration, and State Commission on Economy and Trade, November 2002
(hereinafter SOE Restructuring Rules);
Provisional Rules on the Acquisition of Domestic Enterprises by Foreign
Investors,118 issued by the Ministry of Foreign Trade and Economic Cooperation, the State
General Administration of Taxation, the State General Administration of Industry and
Commerce, and the State Administration of Foreign Exchange, March 2003 (hereinafter
Foreign Acquisition Rules), and
Administrative Measures on the Disclosure of Change in Share Holding of
Shareholders,119 issued by the CSRC, September 2002 (hereinafter the Disclosure
Measures).
The above laws, together with a number of other decrees and rules concerning IPOs,
disclosure, and foreign exchange control with regard to foreign takeovers, are so confusing
that even a China law expert may have difficulties to sort them out. The basic logic is that
the Rules on Foreign Acquisition and Rules on Transfer of State and Legal Person Shares
are the two main laws particularly with regard to foreign takeovers, with the rest being
supplemental only. As previously noted, the laws on M&A demonstrate strongly the
dualist nature of Chinese securities regulations.120
Compared with previous M&A rules which are either prohibitive or very restrictive,
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the recently enacted regulations are rather liberal. Yet they still show strong Chinese
characteristics which are worth noting here.
First, national treatment to foreign investors is established. Foreigners can directly
buy shares of domestic firms from domestic shareholders or from new issuances of the
firms (so-called “equityinterest M&A”). Alternatively, they can conduct “assets M&A”
by setting up foreign invested enterprises (FIEs) and use the FIEs to buy assets from
domestic firms, or by buying assets from domestic firms and then using the assets to set up
FIEs.121 There is no percentage limitation on a foreigner’s shareholding in the target
company or new company. In addition, the laws do not differentiate foreign or domestic
M&As in terms of rules on information disclosure and takeover procedures.122
Accordingly, a domestic firm acquired by foreign investors is not deemed as FIE and does
not enjoy the normal preferential treatments afforded to FIEs according to the three major
FIE laws.123
Second, in M&A foreign investors still need to comply with China’s state policies
regarding the directions of foreign investment embodied in the Guidelines on Foreign
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Investment and the Foreign Investment Catalogue. The Guidelines and Catalogue
prohibits foreign investment in certain sectors such as production and research of
transgenic plant seeds, exploration and mining of radioactive minerals, production of
certain traditional Chinese medicines, and a variety of service areas.124 In some other areas,
such as transport by water and railway, telecommunication, distribution services, etc.,
foreign control is restricted to less than 50 percent.125
Third, the rules encourage and even require mid- and long-term investment.
Foreign investors can only transfer their acquired shareholding twelve months after they
have paid up “in full” the consideration for M&A.126 The purpose of this provision, as
stated in the leading principles of the Foreign Acquisition Rules, is to “attract mid- and
long- term investment, prevent short-term speculation, and maintain due order in the
securities market.”127
Fourth, the price of state shares and legal person shares shall be determined by way
of open tender.128 More specifically, in a takeover process involving foreigners, although
the parties generally can agree on the price, the Foreign Acquisitions Rules require that the
parties shall base the trading price on the valuation made by assets valuation institutions.129
Curiously and confusingly, the Rules say that the parties “may by agreement choose asset
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valuation institutions incorporated in China.”130 What causes confusion is the word
“may.” It is surely not clear whether the parties can agree otherwise as “may” is normally
understood as non-mandatory. However, practitioners who do M& A legal work in China
understood the rules as “to require valuation by PRC valuation institution.”131 The law
also explicitly prohibits transfer or sale of shares at a price “manifestly lower” than
valuation which is deemed as “transfer of assets abroad in disguised form.”132
Fifth, employees of thetarget company shall be taken care of. Contrary to the
Anglo-American style of takeover which deems the matters relating to the unemployment
of the workers of the target company an issue total irrelevant to securities regulations,
China’s M&A rules impose a social responsibility on the acquiring foreign company in this
regard. In order for the authorities to approve a deal, an “employee arrangement scheme”
with regard to the workers of the target shall be submitted as part of application package.133
The most interesting part of the recent M&A laws is probably the antitrust
provisions, in which China asserts both domestic and extraterritorial jurisdiction over
takeover activities. In the case of domestic M&As, the foreign investor must submit a
report to the Ministry of Commerce (MOC) and the State Administration of Industry and
Commerce (SAIC) if (1) one of the parties to the deal has a business turnover exceeding
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RMB1.5 billion (about US$ 181 million) in China, (2) the aggregate number of M&As of
domestic companies in the relevant industry of China within one year exceeds ten, (3) the
China market share of a party to the M&A has reached 20 percent, or (4) the M&A will
result in the share of the China market of a party to the M&A reaching 25 percent.134
China also asserts jurisdiction over global M&As if they have economic interests in China.
Briefly, the parties to an offshore transaction shall submit a report to the MOC and SAIC
for approval if any of the following triggers is met: (1) one of the parties to the offshore
M&A has assets exceeding RMB three billion (about US$ 362 million) in China, (2) a
party’s business turnover in China exceeds RMB 1.5 billion in the current year, (3) share
of the China market of a party and its affiliates has reached 20 percent, (4) the M&A will
result in the share of the China market of a party and its affiliates reaching 25 percent, and
(5) as a result of the offshore M&A, a party to the deal will directly or indirectly hold
equity in more than 15 FIEs in the relevant industry in China.135 According to a
practitioner, these provisions, having worldwide transactional implications, are likely to
make China the third major antitrust jurisdictions after the United States and EU.136

D. Foreign Participation in Securities Intermediaries Services
Foreign participation in China’s securities business was once heavily restricted in
China. The OECD, in one of its reports on China’s capital market in 2002, depicted the
situation as the following:
China’s restrictions on foreign participation are very severe …. In the domestic
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capital market, foreign institutions are now effectively excluded from virtually all activities
involving Chinese domestic investors. Foreign intermediaries cannot deal with Chinese
investors in domestic primary offerings, engage in secondary market trading of A -shares,
and may not form investment funds or other institutional savings products that are
marketed to Chinese residents. Foreign intuitions are limited to soliciting orders for Bshares from non-residents, with a Chinese partner required to complete the trade on the
exchange.137
China’s WTO accession fundamentally changed the situation. On June 1, 2002,
half a year after joined the world trading system, the CSRC released two laws allowing
foreign participation in securities firms and fund management business: the Rules for
Establishing Foreign-Invested Fund management Companies (hereinafter the Fund
Rules),138 and the Rules for Establishing Foreign-Invested Securities Companies
(hereinafter Securities Companies Rules).139
According to the Fund Rules, foreign companies can establish fund management
join ventures either through purchasing shares of existing domestic fund management
companies or co-establish new joint ventures with Chinese partners, both in the form of
limited liability companies.140 A foreign party in the joint venture shall be a financial
institution with good records (meaning it has not been seriously punished by the regulatory
or judicial authority of its home jurisdiction in the recent three years) and with a paid-up
capital no less than RMB 300 million (about US$ 36 million), in addition to any other
137
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prudential requirement that might be raised by the CSRC. It shall also come from a
jurisdiction which has signed a “memorandum of understanding” (MOU) with the
CSRC.141
The Rules also stipulate the percentage limit on the shareholding of foreign
investors in the joint ventures. In line with China’ WTO commitments, the foreign partner
is limited to a 33 percent stake initially, but foreign ownership will be allowed to rise to 49
percent three years after China’s accession to the WTO.142
The Securities Companies Rules have similar provisions allowing foreigners to buy
shares from a domestic securities company or jointly establish a new company with a
domestic partner (not limited to domestic securities firms) in the form of limited liability
companies.143 The foreign partner, being a financial institution which has engaged in
financial business for more than ten years with good records, shall also have good internal
control system as well as good reputation and business performance in international
securities markets.144 Needless to say, this kind of soft “requirements” place great
discretion in the hands of Chinese bureaucrats in charge of the approving process. The
share percentage of the foreign partner in the joint venture is limited to one-third.145
A foreign invested securities firm is allowed to engage in a broad range of
securities services, including underwriting of stock (for both A shares and B shares) and
bonds (government and corporate bonds), brokerage of B shares, brokerage and self141
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operation of bonds, as well as other businesses as may be approved by the CSRC.146
Compared with domestic securities firms, they are not allowed to provide brokerage
services for A shares, and to engage in securities custody, buying and selling stocks for
their own account, as well as in consulting services.

III.

TRAPS FOR WOLVES: THE LEGAL

PROBLEMS FACING FOREIGN INVESTORS
A. Legal Risks Peculiar to the Chinese Stock Market
Investment risks exist in almost every capital market. Entering into the Chinese
market (and any market), foreigners are prepared to accept commercial and market risks
such as price fluctuations, mistakes in corporate decision-making, change of fashion,
economic recession due to cycles, as well as other uncertainties which are inherent in the
nature of doing business. These risks are not the subject of this article. There are also
legal and policy risks in a market thatare to be incu rred as a result of changes in
governmental policies and regulations. Legal (and policy) risks are normal in a mature
market insofar as they are created in an environment in which the government merely play
the role of regulator and nothing else (such as a significant shareholder), and the regulatory
culture is consistent and coherent with a viable framework of rule of law.
Setting foot in China’s stock market, foreign investors wish to profit either from
trading stocks or from directly participating in the management of Chinese companies
through mergers and acquisition. The special features of China’s stock market have caused
a variety of legal and policy risks which shall be characterized as systemic problems
peculiar to China. As previously noted, the stock market comprises substantial state
146
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ownership, with SOEs constituting the majority of listed companies. In addition, twothirds of the shares are non-tradable. In such a context, regulators of the stock market
often face the “identity” problem, namely, whether they shall act as regulators of the
market, for which they should treat all the parties equally, or as owner of state shares, for
which their first priority is to ensure the realization of the multiple objectives of the
government in terms of both maximizing of state assets and maintaining social stability
even at the expense of the economic interest of other shareholders. As a matter of fact,
most paradoxes in China’s stock market are closely tied to SOEs. The vivid characteristics
of emerging markets also present problems in connection to rule of law, corruption, poor
corporate governance, and lack of a credit system. In addition, the current laws place
tremendous power on the part of majority shareholders while provide little protection for
minority shareholders. Judicial remedies, while only emerging in this current year, are
quite limited as well as restrictive. As foreign investors will still only be able to hold
minority shares in many cases due to various constraints, protection of minority will be a
major concern.
The B Shares market can be used to illustrate some of the problems facing foreign
investors. Notwithstanding the many efforts used by Chinese regulators to boost it, the
market is still far from attractive and has performed poorly so far. Notorious problems in
the market include the lack of liquidity, restrictions on foreign securities firms, lack of
proper disclosure of information, and uncertainty of B shareholders’ rights with respect to
the issuers. First, under the B Shares Regulations, information disclosure documents of the
issuers for B shares shall be prepared in Chinese.147 Although the laws state that foreign
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language version documents can be provided when needed, it is not required.148 This could
be justified to the extent that investors should not expect documents in a language other
than Chinese as they choose to invest in Chinese companies. However, as the investors
originally targeted are solely foreigners, provision of documents in a language they are
familiar with should reasonably be the requirement; otherwise, it would result in
inadequate disclosure because of language barriers. Investors also lack trust in China’s
accounting system. While the B Shares Regulations insincerely stipulate that the issuing
company may provide financial reports adjusted according to the International Accounting
Standards or the accounting standards of the place outside China where the offer is
conducted, reports produced are still unreliable because the overall reports of the company
produced are based on China’s Enterprise Accounting Standards which do not inspire
popular confidence so far. In terms of shareholder’s rights, the B Shares Regulations
explicitly offer the same rights to foreigners as their domestic counterparts.149 In addition,
a foreign shareholder may entrust a proxy with exercising his shareholder’s rights on his or
her behalf.150 However, this provision may not be meaningful because the regulations did
not grant shareholders the right to pursue derivative action. The absence of such a
provision means thatshareholders may not have a legal basis to sue directors and officers
who have violated their fiduciary duties.151 Moreover, shareholders who intend to control
a Chinese company through trading of B shares may be frustrated, because they are not
148
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allowed to buy A shares which generally constitute the majority of total shares in a
company. All these serve as obstacles to bar the further development of the B shares
markets.

B. The Regulations and Regulatory Culture: Too Burdensome and Ambiguous
to be Tolerable?
Any investor must face regulations and regulators, which jointly form the
regulatory regime. Regulators are tough and regulations burdensome – this is probably a
worldwide phenomenon. However, in advanced stock markets there is always a boundary,
namely, regulators normally play the role of watchdog for the marketplace, providing rule
of law and maintaining a fair, orderly, and transparent market. For example, the main duty
of the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) is to ensure the implementation of
federal rules regarding disclosure, and in no case is it expected to be a guarantor of
corporate profits.152 The uniqueness of the Chinese regulators (especially the chief
regulator CSRC)is that they are designed to play multiple roles, in which being watchdog
is the minor. Briefly speaking, the CSRC is chiefly equipped with two tasks, including
“developing” as well as “regulating” the capital market, and is expected to do both well.153
In addition, as a state agency, the CSRC and other regulators concerned (such as the PBC)
are more or less considered as representatives for the state in taking care of state assets.
Conflict of interests and ambiguous identity caused by multiple roles of the
152

See Donald C. Clarke, Corporate Governance in China: An Overview, in China Economic Review

(forthcoming 2003), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/abstract=424885.
153

See Zhao Wenguang, Gushi fazhan xuyao “liangzhi shou” tuidong [The growth of the stock market needs

push from “two hands”], in Zhengquan Shichang Zhoukan [Securities Market Weekly](Sep. 22, 2003),
available at http://news.sohu.com.

47

regulators, in conjunction with lack of experience, have led to both under-regulation and
over-regulation, as well as ambiguous laws. In one sense, the CSRC is probably the most
powerful regulator in the world, and China is the most heavy-handedly regulated
market.154 Contrary to the belief of free market theory in most developed capital markets,
China’s IPO market is dominated by the mentality of plan economy in which the
government directly controls the IPO process as well as any follow-up issuance,
determining which enterprise is able to issue shares. In fact, the CSRC views this market
access authority as its main duty. In addition, the CSRC is in charge of issuing licenses to
intermediaries service providers including securities companies, accounting firms, brokers,
fund managers, and securities consultants. Even newspapers and magazines must have
obtained licenses from the CSRC in order to publish statements of listed or prospective
listed companies. For a long period before 2003, lawyers needed to obtain licenses from
the CSRC in order to provide legal opinions for companies with regard to securities. Most
of those licenses only have one-year duration so the CSRC is always able to kick anybody
out of the market by withdrawing or refusing to renew license.155
Regulations in China’s stock market often go to ridiculously detail and specific.
For instance, before the launch of an IPO, the CSRC sends personnel (called “preliminary
interviewer”) to the company seeking listing to check its qualifications. The preliminary
interview decides all the material issues relating to IPO, including, among others, number
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of shares, price, timing of issuance, as well as choosing the stock exchange to list.156
When intermediaries are involved, the CSRC has detailed provisions as to how the
underwriters shall proceed to “educate” their clients, the kinds of lawyers a company shall
hire, which accounting firms shall be retained by listed companies conducting financial
business … so on and so forth.157 Furthermore, self-regulation is almost non-existent as all
NGOs in China’s securities market are de facto inferior subsidiaries of the CSRC. For
example, the two stock exchanges are no more than two departments of the CSRC, at least
in the sense that their heads are appointed and their internal rules approved by the
regulator.158
As noted by Prof. Fang Liufang of the China University of Political Science and
Law, “guanzhi guodu” (over-regulation) is the major problem in China’s securities market.
A direct result of it is that capital flow out of China to escape burdensome domestic
restrictions through the setting up of offshore companies.159 Indeed, since 1990s, the
amount of capital flowing out of China has been larger than China’s receipt of oversea
capital.160 Ironically, although it is equipped with over-reaching regulatory power, the
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CSRC has no accountability to shareholders. The official Xinhua News Agency recently
claimed that the CSRC “should be responsible for the listing of unqualified companies, the
falsification of financial statements by listed companies, joint trading of listed companies
with their controlling shareholders, excessive speculation and insider manipulation.”161
Certainly neither the CSRC as an agency nor any of its individual officer has been pursued
for responsibility.
Another risk resulting from conflicting multi-objectives of the regulators is the
swaying and often unpredictable regulatory culture due to a change of the person in charge.
The swaying culture is most prominent in recent years in the sense that certain chiefs of the
CSRC prefer to play a larger role in “regulating” while others like to help “develop” the
stock market with certain tolerance of fraudulent activities. In February 2000, liberalminded Zhou Xiaochuan ascended to the chairmanship of CSRC. With the assistance of
Executive Vice President Mr. Gao Xiqing who was basically an America-trained lawyer,162
he began to transform substantially the Commission into a regulatory machine, with a view
to establishing a “clean” market subject to clear rules and transparency and a powerful
regulatory framework modeled after the SEC of the United States. For Zhou, the major
task for the CSRC was to establish its role as an independent regulator rather than the
representative of state ownership.163 Using the metaphor of football games , he stressed
161
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that the regulator should act as a judge for all players, never attempting to go down to the
greenfiled to play itself.164 Zhou’s commission focused its work mainly on enacting and
enforcing disclosure rules. In 2001 along, the CSRC introduced 51 new regulations and
disciplined more than 81 listed companies and 10 intermediaries, including law firms and
accounting firms, for violations for securities laws.165 The result was more than obvious:
China’s stock market entered into the longest bear period since the beginning of 2001, and
has not recovered so far. According to the statistics provided by the CSRC, from the
middle of 2001 to the end of 2002, the stock market suffered a loss of RMB638 billion
(about US$77 billion).166
The Zhou-Gao’s regulatory style, emphasizing on supervision and compliance,
certainly irritated many persons who have stakes only in a bull market and even incurred
the blame of many investors for their losses. In addition, although supported by Premier
Zhu Rongji, they had actually less friends among officials. In a 2002 stock market seminar,
four former CSRC chairman coincidentally made speeches saying the development of the
market should be priority under any circumstance.167 In December 2002, Zhou was moved
to the position of the president of the People’s Bank of China (PRC’s central bank) and
succeeded by Mr. Shang Fulin, a former veteran from the army. Shortly after his takeover
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of the CSRC, Mr. Shang made it very clear that all the problems “are part of the
development and shall be solved through development,”168 and requiring a “correct
solution to the relationship among reform, development, and stability.”169 Needless to say,
investors see another shift in regulatory culture, without being able to know the orientation
of the next personality in charge of the CSRC.
Mr. Zhou’s perspective for establishing a clean market is certainly correct insofar
as normal, developed stock markets are concerned. The Chinese market’s uniqueness
renders his efforts to model the SEC futile. However, denying the positive role of Zhou
still cannot solve the existing dilemma in China’s stock market: the absence of a set of
clear and transparent rules and effective enforcement. Failing such an achievement, fraud
as the main theme of the market is unlikely to be changed irrespective of how big China’s
stock market is “developed” to.

C. SOE Reform, Corruption, and Fraudulent Activities in the Market
In the words of Prof. Fang Liufang, “in theory, China’s Securities Law, Company
Law, and the regulatory framework are strict enough to prevent any market fraud
activity.”170 The reality, however, is very different. Due to the structural flaws of the
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market arising out of initial design, massive fraudulent activities exist in both the first (IPO
or new issuance) and the secondary (exchange) markets. In 2001, Wu Jinglian, one of
China’s most prestigious economists, proclaimed in a program of China’s Central TV
Station that China’s stock market “is just like a casino, but worse than that,” because “even
casinos have rules so that you can’t look at other people’s cards. But in our stock market,
many people can peer at the cards of others, can cheat, can practice fraud. [In brief],
market manipulation and insider trading have reached their extremity.”171
The root of the problem rests with China’s struggling SOE reform. To reinvigorate
its cumbersome SOEs, China has tried several approaches. In the early 1990s,
concurrently with the drafting and passage of the Company Law, the government launched
a new approach – “corporatization”, one aspect of which is to transform SOEs into listed
stock companies. As a programmatic document of the Communist Party of China (CPC)
stated, “The joint stock system is a form of capital organization of modern enterprises,
which is favorable for separating ownership from management and raising the efficiency of
operation of enterprises and capital.”172 From the government’s view, this approach
presents several benefits. First, it expands the fund-raising channel for SOEs. Second,
SOEs can transform their operational mechanisms in compliance with the requirements of

171

See Wu Jinglian nuchi gushi heizhuang [Wu Jinglian scolds fraudulent institutions in the stock market],

interview of Wu Jinglian by the “Economy 30 Minutes” of the CCTV (Jan. 15, 2001), transcript available at
http://www.people.com.cn/GB/jinji/35/159/20010115/378998.html [hereinafter “Wu’s interview”].
172

Jiang Ze Min, Hold High the Great Banner of Deng Xiaoping Theory for an All-Round Advancement of

the Cause of Building Socialism with Chinese Characteristics into the 21 Century – Report Delivered at the
National Congress of the Communist Party of China on September 12, 1997.

53

modern enterprises. Thirdly, it helps to allocate financial resources to benefit SOEs.173
These optimistic predictions, if not complete daydreams, at least turn out to be one-sided
wishes in some sense.
The name of many (and probably most) transformed stock companies fall short of
their substance. They have merely the corporate cloak of Western-style stock companies,
but are still being run in the old way of administrative control. 174 For many SOEs, the
main benefit from the transformation into joint stock company is not the opportunities to
“restructure itself into a modern enterprises”, but rather to raise capital to alleviate
financial difficulties.175 In order to obtain approval from the CSRC for IPO, they disclose
false figures of profits or even forge financial reports.176 As stated by Prof. Fang in an
interview,
When a SOE obtains a quota for IPO, even though it has suffered loss in the past
three years [which hence cannot meet the initial legal requirement for IPO], it can
immediately have profit earnings in the past three consecutive years simply by requesting
those “securities accountants” to cook accounting statements for them, of course with
extra high pay to those accountants. … The issuer’s “make-up” fee is eventually absorbed
by the “issuance cost”, which shall be deducted from the capital contribution paid by
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investors purchasing the shares. SOEs made-up – intermediaries provide make-up service
– investors pay the bill: this is the entire process of the game.177
Because each SOE has a supervising body which is either an agency of the central
government or local governments and which has a tremendous stake in the company’s
going-public, the listing process is highly politicized, involving enormous rent-seeking
activities and corruption. The 2002-litigated “Macat case” is a telling one. Macat Co.
obtained approval from the CSRC and launched IPO in August 2000. In November 2000
the CSRC identified that Macat falsified hundreds of millions of dollars of profit and
revenue in its financial statements. According to the disclosed CSRC report and court
judgment for this case, not only the company, a small entity without any substantial assets,
purposely cheated the public, all the intermediaries, including an accounting firm, an asset
valuation institution, a law firm, and a securities company, helped fabricate the false
statements.178 The case was characterized as involving a “sophisticated production line for
producing false accounting reports and numbers in the securities market.”179 Eventually a
dozen managers and professionals were prosecuted for violating the criminal law.180
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According to a commentator, the massive accounting fraud perpetrated on the
market in the Macat case was rather a phenomenon than an individual case.181 For both
foreign and domestic investors, the quality of listed companies shall always be thought
twice, as the disclosure reports provided by various intermediary service providers, which
are supposed to serve as the “soft” regulatory infrastructure, cannot be trusted outright.
D. Poor Corporate Governance: Listed Companies Too Dark to Be Visible
Corporate governance was suddenly brought into the landscape of China’s
securities market in 2001 by the famous YinGuangXia case.182 Since then, this issue,
becoming a high profile topic, has been placed at the very top of the regulator’s agenda and
mentioned frequently in all the recent keynote speeches by the Chinese, ranging from the
Premier to university professors.183
Poor corporate governance is still a problem caused by the inherent paradox of
SOEs which constitute the majority of listed companies. Because the government restricts
the sale of tradable shares to investors, normally in any listed SOE the state owns at least
two- third of the shares (including state shares and legal person shares), which are not
tradable (and thus transferable to private investors by any means) as a matter of law. This
one-third privatization naturally leads to the prominent “one shareholder (the state
shareholder) too dominating” problem. Owners of the one-third tradable shares, composed
mainly of dispersed individual investors, have no meaningful influence on the decision181
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making process in the listed SOEs.184 In addition, China’s corporate and securities laws,
understandably in the sense that they were made to protect state assets, place very strong
power on the majority shareholder with respect to voting rights and corporate management.
The state is, after all, an abstract owner. It must exercise its ownership through
human agents. Clarke thus correctly observed that “State-owned enterprises were thus
always controlled, both at the enterprise level and at the level of the administrative body in
charge of them, by human beings who did not own the enterprise.”185 Due to the absence
of the effective ultimate owner (the state), power to control the SOEs rests in the hands of
appointed managers, which can only be monitored by competent government agencies.
When serious violations of securities laws or infringements of state assets are discovered,
it is not uncommon to find that the state agencies either lacked the necessary supervisory
capability or simply conspired (through corrupt officials) with the directors and managers
of the listed companies to steal the shareholders’ property.
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The YinGuangXia case is the most influential one of this kind involving severe
losses to thousands of minority shareholders due to almost non-existent corporate
governance. In May 2002, the CSRC issued a penalty report finding that, from 1998 to
2001, YinGuangXia Co. fabricated sales receipts and disclosed false information about
various production facilities that actually never existed. The company lied to the market
concerning RMB1 billion (about 120 million) in revenue and RMB771 million in profit.186
With this bright spot in the financial statements it led investors to believe it was the longexpected “blue chip” in China’s stock market. The sole purpose of all the
misrepresentation was to induce investors to buy its follow-up issuance. According to the
investigation of the official Xinhua News Agency, since 1994 to 2001, YinGuangXia made
three follow-up offerings and collected RMB574 million from the market, resulting the
severe losses to thousands of small investors.187
One of the major reasons causing the YinGuangXia scandal was the virtual nonexistence of corporate governance in this literally state-owned listed company. According
to the Xinhua investigation, the meetings ofthe board of directors had always been done
perfunctorily, with decisions decided by “core” people without transparency.188 The
fraudulent activities were conducted by the CEO of YinGuangXia Tianji Inc. which was a
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wholly owned subsidiary of YinGuangXia and was the major revenue source of the listed
company. As noted by Prof. Li Weian, the Dean of the International Business School of
Nankai University of China (in the city of Tianjin), the board of directors completely failed
in certain aspects of corporate governance, including governance of its subsidiary and the
corporate management. In addition, non-state shareholders were entirely deprived of the
right to monitor the board and the management.189
In the foreseeable future, foreigners still have to face the problem of poor corporate
governance and the predominance of the “legal representative” of the state shareholder.
Needless to say, their keenness in participating in China’s stock market, which the Chinese
regulators see as an opportunity to restructure its SOEs and national economy, will be
limited if the poor corporate problem is not solved.

E.

Absence of Effective Judicial Protection of Minority Investors
Despite the enormous number of securities disputes regarding frauds, judicial

involvement is so far limited and self-constrained on the part of Chinese courts. When the
YinGuangXia scandal and another fraudulent case (Yorkpoint Science and Technology Co.)
occurred in 2001, hundreds of investors rushed to courts for help, and they were frustrated
by the judiciary’s reluctance to process securities litigation. On September 21, the
Supreme Court of China released a notice requiring all the lower courts temporarily not to
accept securities lawsuits concerning insider trading, fraud, market manipulation, etc, on
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the ground of the “constraints created by the current legislative and judicial conditions.”190
A shock to investors, professionals and scholars (and certainly a comfort to some others), it
fueled a debate on the rule of law and judicial role for the development of the securities
market. Yet if one’s thinking came down to earth the Court’s decision appeared
reasonable and understandable, at least according to Mr. LI Guoguang, the then Vice
President of the Supreme Court.191 First, there was an issue of lack of judicial coordination.
As investors would initiate different lawsuits against the same defendants in many
domestic jurisdictions, different lower courts would render conflicting rulings due to the
absence of coherent criteria. This would jeopardize the reputation and credibility of the
legal system. Secondly, the concern was about the overloading of the entire court system
by individual securities lawsuits. Thirdly, judicialin capability was frankly admitted,
especially the lack of prior experience of judges, and the absence of national uniform
standards as regards evidential rules and damage determination would only make things
worse. Finally, the concern was about the protection of state assets. As indicated by
Justice LI, “if there were to be numerous lawsuits against all these listed firms and if the
private plaintiffs were awarded the rightfully deserved relief, it would lead to major losses
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of state assets (since the listed companies are mostly state-controlled).”192 Clearly, the
socialist ideology of state ownership prevailed over justice for individual rights.
Four months later, a second notice came from the Supreme Court allowing Chinese
courts to accept private securities cases concerning misrepresentation.193 It set up relevant
judicial standards and definition for “misrepresentation”,194 but confines courts’
jurisdiction only to this type of claims. In addition, it preconditioned judicial acceptance
of these cases on the prior penalty report of the CSRC establishing the facts and
evidence.195 Arguably, this breached the principle of judicial independence guaranteed by
the PRC Constitution and was alleged to be a re-writing of the Securities Law enacted by
the country’s top legislature, the National People’s Congress (NPC).196 Nevertheless, a
wave of lawsuits flooded the courts after the promulgation of this notice.197
The most comprehensive judicial interpretation, Provisions concerning Civil
Securities Litigation on Misrepresentation Cases [hereinafter the CSL Provisions],198 was
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released in January 9, 2003, obviously as a response to outcries of lower courts for more
detailed procedural and substantive rules. The CSL Provisions make no change to the
confinement of private securities litigation only to misrepresentation cases, and affirm the
requirement of preconditioning private lawsuits on the prior investigation and
administrative decisions of the CSRC and other state ministries. Investors in China’s
securities market still have no judicial recourse for cases concerning insider trading,
market manipulation, and other fraudulent activities, and they have to sue in the courts of
the places where the defendants are headquartered and where local protectionism is a
prevailing concern.

IV.

PROSPECTS FOR FURTHER LIBERALIZATION
AND IMPROVEMENT OF THE REGULATIONS:
ANALYSES AND RECOMMENDATIONS

Having described the state of regulatory affairs of China’s stock market with
respect to foreign investment and analyzed the legal problems facing foreign investors, the
next step, logically, is to explore the prospects for the future of China’s securities
regulations in this regard. As noted by many commentators, there will be no future for
China’s securities markets – and accordingly no future for the success of foreign
participation in the markets – if those structural flaws and systemic problems are not
solved.199 Given the strong paternalism in China’s securities markets, viable securities
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regulations should play a significant role in shaping a sound environment for the
development of the market. However, the perfection of China’s securities regulations with
regard to foreign investment depends on China’s determination to honor its WTO
obligations, a reflection of the role of foreign investors, repositioning the government in
economic development, the advance of privatization of Chinese economy and, most
importantly, rule of law and institutions building for the market economy.

A. WTO Compliance
A Member of the WTO, China is expected to comply with all the obligations under
the General Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS)200 in terms of financial services and
has so far obtained mixed evaluations with regard to its performance. As a WTO member
who had struggled 15 years to join the multilateral trading institution largely due to the
stern demands on market access from other GATT/WTO members and whose foreign
economic relations are now primarily governed by WTO agreements, China’s compliance
with WTO obligations constitutes the most important aspect of its bilateral and multilateral
engagements with other countries.
market is marginalized?], and YU Li, Quanshang zhi huan: Shoudu Jingmao Daxue Liu JiPeng Jiaoshou
Zhuan Fang [Worries of the securities business – interview of Prof. Liu Jipeng of the Capital Economic and
Trade University], both in Nanfang Zhoumo [Nanfang Weekly] (Sep. 11, 2003), available at
http://www.nanfangdaily.com.cn/zm, and http://news.sohu.com. In the second article, Prof. Liu stated: “It
can basically be concluded that the capital market is in its most difficult, grim period since its inception 11
years ago. The grim situation does not lies in the fact that it is fundamentally a bear market. More severely,
we don’t know what’s the future of China’s capital market, and we are at loss, not knowing where it is
heading to.” See id.
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GATS, part (and Annex 1B) of the Agreement Establishing the World Trade
Organization, contains two components: the first is the framework agreement setting the
basic rules and the second a schedule recording each country’s specific commitments and a
list of most favored nation exemptions. Pursuant to GATS as well as China’s WTO
accession agreements, China undertakes the following three general obligations:
(1) Most- favored-nation treatment: Members are required to “accord immediately
and unconditionally to services and service suppliers of any other Member treatment no
less favorable than that it accords to like services and service suppliers of any other
country.”201 The objective of this provision is to ensure a WTO Member treats other
members on a non-discrimination basis. In China’s Accession Protocol it agrees to accord
to foreign individuals and enterprises as well as foreign-funded enterprises “treatment no
less favorable than that accorded to other individuals and enterprises in respect of (a) the
procurement of inputs and goods and services necessary for production and the conditions
under which their goods are produced, marketed or sold, in the domestic market and for
export; and (b) the prices and availability of goods and services supplied by national and
sub-national authorities and public or state enterprises, in areas including transportation,
energy, basic telecommunications, other utilities and factors of production.”202 Apparently,
financial services, including securities services, are embedded in this commitment.
However, pursuant to GATS Art. II(2) which authorizes Members to make deviations from
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MFN obligation, China can accord particular countries less than MFN treatment as long as
it has listed these deviations (called MFN exemptions) in its GATS Art. II Schedule.203
(2) Transparency: Art III of GATS provides that each Member shall “publish
promptly” all relevant domestic measures of general application which pertain to or affect
the operation of GATS as well as international agreements pertaining to or affecting trade
in services to which the Member is a signatory.204 According to its commitments with
respect to transparency, China undertakes only to enforce laws that are published. In
addition, it agrees to provide to WTO Members, upon request, all laws affecting trade in
services, and establish an official journal and entry point which make Chinese laws readily
available to any individual, enterprise or WTO Member.205
(3) Fair application of laws: Art. VI of GATS requires WTO Members to ensure
that “measures of general application affecting trade in services are administered in a
reasonable, objective and impartial manner.”206 This article is intended to prevent
Members from denying, nullifying, or impairing GATS benefits to other Members through
the use of onerous domestic administrative measures. In this regard, China commits itself
to “apply and administer in a uniform, impartial and reasonable manner all its laws,
regulations and other measures of the central government as well as local regulations, rules
and other measures issued or applied at the sub-national level pertaining to or affecting
trade in … services …”207
203

See GATS, art. II(2).

204

See GATS, art. III.

205

See the Protocol, supra note 203, Part I(2)(C).

206

See GATS, art. VI.

207

See the Protocol, supra note 203, Part I(2)(A)(2).

65

The above principles, covering all aspects of regulatory and administrative
measures affecting trade in services, form the kind of general obligations that apply almost
without qualification to all financial services activities, including securities services. China
has also given a variety of specific commitments with regard to securities services. Those
commitments, although fully binding and embodying the principle of market access and
national treatment, apply to a Member only to the extent that the country has made an
affirmative commitment in their Schedule to be bound (the so-called “positive list”).208
Specifically, China allows foreign securities institutions to engage directly (without
Chinese intermediaries) in B Shares business. They may also become Special Members of
all Chinese stock exchanges. Foreigners are permitted to establish joint ventures with
foreign investment up to 33 percent within three years after China’s accession and 49
percent thereafter. From 2005, they can also establish joint ventures in China in the
underwriting of A shares and in underwriting and trading of B shares and H shares as well
as government and corporate bonds.209
Part II of the article can demonstrate that, according to “the law on paper”, China
has enacted laws fully consistent with its WTO obligations.210 There is little doubt that the

208

See GATS, art. 16, 17 and 18.

209

See WTO, Report of the Working Party on the Accession of China, Addendum, Schedule CLII – The

People’s Republic of China, Part II – Schedule of Specific Commitments on Services on Service (and) List of
Article II MFN Exemptions, 1 October 2001, WT/ACC/CHN/49/Add.2 (hereinafter China’s Service
Commitments).
210

It shall be noted that China’s commitments do not contain obligations relating to opening up China’s

domestic capital markets to foreigners. They merely apply to measures allowing service market access and

66

“law in reality” will be significantly different as China’s policies are also exposed to
interest groups politics, in which the lobbying power of international financial capitalists
who have enormous stake in China’s honoring of its commitments plays a substantial role.
The crucial question is that WTO has pose challenges to China’s traditional thinking on
socialist ideology of property ownership, country governance, relationship between the
government and private citizens, as well as economic integration and globalization. In
essence, WTO accession and compliance provides the momentum for constructing the rule
of law and civil society in China as well as reducing state ownership to the minimum
(through privatization) insofar as social stability and controlling capacity of the ruling
party are threatened. The following sections will discuss the impact of WTO on China in
these areas.

B. Rethinking the Role of Foreign Investors and Pace of Financial
Liberalization
Policy makers and regulators in China are often obsessed with sovereign concern
on the control of the national economy. While they long for foreign investment and have
successfully made the country among the largest recipients of foreign capital in the past
decade,211 they have also taken tremendous precautionary measures preventing foreign
control in Chinese companies, except in a limited, selected body of enterprises.
Fortunately, this mentality, faced with challenges posed by both poor performance of a
MFN and NT treatment, when obligated, to foreign service suppliers. For example, permitting foreign
enterprises to takeover Chinese SOEs is not included in China GATS obligations.
211
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substantial number of domestic SOEs and economic globalization has been changing
particularly in recent years. Yet it might still be a very subtle issue in the sense that
domestic sovereign and financial stability are legitimate concerns among the many nations
of the world, and this is especially true in the context that it is often alleged thatshort term-profit-oriented international investors contributed to the 1997-98 Asian Financial
Crisis.
Embracing foreign investors, however, is a global trend. The OECD, in comparing
the situation with China, notes that “All OECD countries have accepted the principle that
foreign investors should be allowed to invest without limit in their domestic equity markets,
although some countries make exceptions for certain ‘strategic’ industries.”212 Foreign
investors, especially foreign institutional investors, can not only enlarge the investor base,
but also contribute to the financial innovation in the domestic market. They help the
formation of good corporate governance culture by introducing “international expectations
concerning disclosure governance and profitability into markets and so encourage listed
companies to adhere to global standards.”213
One may argue that, literally, “international expectations” or global best practice, as
mentioned above, might not be necessarily desirable. However, in this particular context,
there are at least two counter-arguments to refute this. First, global capital flow, necessary
for the development of any economy, is very sensitive as regards international standards
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and more likely to float to the place where global best practice is adopted.214 Secondly, the
content of global best practice per se is sufficient to instill confidence in the mind of
international investors – namely, it dictates that “shareholder value is becoming an
accepted standard by which corporate performance is assessed throughout the world.”215
The World Bank describes the overall benefits of foreign participation in developing
countries’ stock market as the following:
Opening stock markets to foreign participation increases liquidity by deepening the
pool of buyers and sellers. Price earning ratios rise as liquidity increases, making the
market a far more attractive source of equity financing. As the stock market develops and
strengthens, it benefits other parts of the financial sector as well as the widereconomy –
foreign direct investment accompanies stock market purchases, for instance. Stock market
development and banking development have a strong positive relationship, as do stock
market liquidity and economic growth.216
There is still a crucial question of making a subtle balance because of the risks
associated with global capital flow. Financial crises in recent years suggest that foreign
portfolio investors can play a key role in contagion of crises by quick shifts in capital flows,
making the host economies more susceptible to volatility and sometimes causing their
collapses.217 The 1997 Asian Financial Crisis was a vivid example. Ironically, China
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escaped the crisis largely thanks to the fact that its financial system was less liberalized
than most of its Asian neighbors. As noted by Nicholas R. Lardy of the Institute for
International Economics, “China’s experience in the Asian financial crisis supports the
view that premature capital account liberalization increases a country’s vulnerability to a
currency crisis.”218
There is little doubt that China will promote the orderly flow of foreign investment
in its securities markets. It is, however, important to stress that improvement and reform
does not necessarily mean unfettered liberalization. A financial crisis caused by overspeculative capital markets is more detrimental and even dangerous to both the Chinese
and world economy. China’s problem is that its financial regulators (when regulating the
capital markets) and its trade negotiators (when giving concessions for trade in services)
could not easily locate the right point of balance between liberalization and restrictive
regulation. Probably for that reason, they are extremely conservative in certain aspects,
such as allowing foreign investors to invest in China’s equity market, while tending to
adopt bold liberalization measures in other aspects, such as a sudden acceptance of foreign
takeover of SOEs without first solving a variety of problems (such as the proper valuation
and pricing of state assets) which are prerequisite to the reform of SOEs. China’s external
commitments in services were also not a result of deliberation of the country’s “national
condition”, a phrase Chinese officials often assert when faced with challenges with regard
to policy legitimacy, but rather part of a liberalization package which has incorporated
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many social, political, and self-interest oriented factors. As observedby Lardy, “In its
WTO negotiations, China’s Moftec negotiators made commitments in services without
sufficiently consulting with the relevant domestic regulators.”219
China should continue to encourage foreign portfolio equity investment without
undermining efforts in attracting foreign direct investment. The distinction between A and
B shares, which generates pricing distortions, should be abandoned. However, there is no
need for China to rush to capital account liberalization until a general environment that will
have appeal to foreign investors is established. As a World Bank research correctly noted,
“in sequencing capital account liberalization, the greatest danger is removal of most
restrictions on capital account transactions before major problems in the domestic financial
system are addressed. Countries in which these problems are severe, but that choose to
suddenly and fully open the capital account, run the risk of incurring a crisis.”220
It is fair to say that China has acted very prudentially and appropriately in many
regulatory aspects. For instance, it enhances the stability and controllability of the
domestic stock market by requiring QFIIs not to repatriate their principal within aperiod
(according to Chinese law it is three years) and foreign companies not to transfer their
shares within one year after their takeover of a Chinese company.221 However, China can
safely advance further liberalization on two fronts.
First, foreign institutional investors should be given more flexibility and larger
freedom for portfolio investment. While the QFII regime is a good start, the access
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requirements are just too high and excessively cautious. For instance, the business
experience requirement (up to 30 years) and paid-up capital (US$1 billion) and managed
assets (up to US$10 billion) requirement are higher than that initially taken by Taiwan, the
pioneer of the QFII system.222 Tremendous amount of middle and small institutional
investment firms, while equipped with excellent management experience, know-how, and
dedicated enthusiasm in emerging markets, are excluded from China’s stock market. In
addition, the requirement that each QFII is only allowed to invest up to US$800 million
will make the aggregate investment of institutional investors a tiny part of the total
capitalization of China’s stock market.
Secondly, greater market access should be given to foreign financial service
suppliers, including securities firms, investment banks, and fund management companies.
While the number of China’s own securities firms (Chinese banks are prohibited to
participate in securities business due to a Glass-Steagall style restriction) has exceeded a
hundred, which, in theory, could form a basis for fair competition, no best practice has
been established due to massive fraudulent activities as well as the cheating culture. Gao
Xiqing, when he was the Executive Vice President of the CSRC, once indicated that every
Chinese stock was manipulated by Chinese institutions, indicating that almost all securities
firms and other institutions played a negative role in standardizing the market order.223 In
another occasion, Gao said again that if he could exercise his free will, he would hire no
Chinese fund management companies to manage China’s social securities funds and the
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only reason preventing him from doing so was that the existing state laws did not allow
this.224 His views on Chinese intermediaries were affirmed by CHENGSiwei, another
senior Chinese official who said recently that violation of laws by securities firms was one
of the major problems in the implementation of China’s Securities Law.225 One of the
many pieces of evidence was that in the Macat cases discussed previously, almost all the
intermediaries conducted serious frauds by helping to falsify documents.226 Given that
most Chinese intermediaries are not so reliable, there is a solid reason to introduce into the
landscape foreign competitors who implement international best practice in supplying
securities services.

C.

Redefining the Role of Government and Regulations, and Introducing
Rule of Law and Institutions Building
In the days of the plan economy, Chinese government agencies used to control

every aspect of the society, including the development of economy. This tradition,
together with the mentality underlying it, has persisted into contemporary days which
could be characterized as a transition period towards a market economy. As the country
advances from plan to market, the role of the government shall also be transformed from
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the “instrument of the ruling class”, as the Communist ideology suggests, to a functional
institution that provides good governance. According to the World Bank,
Good governance includes the creation, protection, and enforcement of property
rights, without which the scope of market transactions is limited. It includes the provision
of a regulatory regime that works with the market to promote competition. And it includes
the provision of sound macroeconomic policies that create a stable environment for market
activity. Good governance also means the absence of corruption, which can subvert the
goal of policy and undermine the legitimacy of the public institutions that support
market.227
In China’s transition to a market economy, the government’s chief task is to
provide institutions supporting the market through regulatory reforms. Regulatory powers
are centered on the system of law.228 “The foundation of a rule of law is built from respect
by both government and citizens for the legitimacy of regulation, from high-quality
regulations, from openness and clarity in the regulatory system, and from processes by
which regulators can be held accountable for the contents of rules.”229 As a general matter,
the government has the mission to provide a functional and enforceable legal and
regulatory framework which meet the following objectives as regards financial and capital
markets:230
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(1) To establish viable, predictable, and flexible commercial rules for the financial
market and financial transactions. In any event, private financial transactions
should be the focus of financial law, simply because they constitute the foundation
of financial markets. Without prosperous and growing commercial transactions, all
public/regulatory regimes would lose their sense and justification for existence.
The commercial rules include those on contract, agency, tort, property, and many
others.
(2) To protect investors and finance consumers (banking clients, securities investors,
insurance policy holders) against the failure (insolvency/bankruptcy) of the service
providers, against bad selling or advisory practices, often caused by conflicts of
interests, and against risky products. The underlying philosophy is that those
investors are just like normal consumers, who are part of the public and should
therefore be protected. In addition, the damage caused to them because of failure
or bad practice of service providers is usually more severe than normal consumer
loss in any other commercial/consumer transactions.
(3) To prevent or minimize contagion or systemic risk of the financial market. It has
become a common phenomenon that, because of the enhanced linkages across
national and international financial markets, the volatility of capital flows and the
potential for concentrated disturbance are more easily and broadly transmitted
across institutional groups or markets, thus triggering inter-market contagion and
causing systemic collapse. In the end, that will lead to financial and economic
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crises, like those thathappened in Mexico and East Asia. Frankly, systemic risk
has provided a major incentive for financial regulation.
(4) To safeguard the proper functions of markets and maintain investors’ confidence,
including the smooth operation of markets, price transparency and proper
information supply, mainly being the prevention of market abuses or manipulation
and insider dealing. A related point is the provision of adequate clearing and
settlement and custody facilities.
(5) To regulate financial intermediaries (service providers) as regards their conduct of
business, integration, and sound reputation. This is essential for financial laws to
work as those intermediaries are presentlythe pillars of markets. A related point is
to create a fair competition environment for those institutions by creating a level
plying filed for them and preventing monopolies amongst those intermediaries in
the financial services.
As repeatedly stressed in this article, China’s regulatory dilemma is that, on the one
hand, regulations are overreaching, overly-complex, multi-layered, often arbitrary and very
interventionist, which lead to excessively high transaction costs; but on the other hand,
many sectors of the market also suffer from substantial under-regulation, poor enforcement,
and under-institutionalization, which lead to insufficient confidence in markets by
consumers and investors. In addition, the regulators, in particular the CSRC, undertake
dual tasks, one of which is developing the market. Especially in these days when the stock
market has been undergoing the longest bear period, CSRC is under enormous pressure to
“save the life of the market” (jiushi) by powerful interest groups including the many
Chinese securities firms. It, however, should realize that, using a Chinese idiom, “yin zhen
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zhi ke” (drinking position to quench thirst) provides no solution to the problem. For the
regulators, there is no alternative to the safeguard of a general environment which ensures
the reasonably accurate disclosure of information and a good corporate governance
structure. Regulatory “forbearance” might be inevitable in many cases due to the
limitation of regulatory capacity; however, the regulators should by no means become
accomplice of market manipulators, insiders, and other law-breakers.
Chinese regulators should also bear in mind that they are not omnipotent.
Regulations should place increasing responsibility on market participants, emphasizing
internal compliance, in-house risk management and governance systems and industry
standards. It is within the broader framework of institutions building to have private firms,
industry associations and self-regulatory organizations (SROs) to undertake greater
responsibility for the elaboration of standards. In order to accomplish this, the key is to
establish clear rules with strong incentives for market participants to positively play their
roles.
A viable stock market, to establish institutions which serve as checks and balances
against abuse of public powers and instill confidence in international and domestic
investors, should have an effective judiciary to ensure the proper application of the rule of
law, rights of administrative procedure, and efficient dispute resolution regimes. In China,
the judiciary is rather weak and self-constrained in providing protection to investors.
Within and without China, the consensus is that China needs a strong judicial system to
safeguard the stock market and provide adequate dispute settlement mechanisms. The gap
of between different opinions lies in different views regarding Chinese judiciary’s capacity
as well as socialist ideology (especially when the concept of “preventing the loss of state
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assets” is concerned). While the first concern could be solved as the experience and
resources of the judiciary expands, the second can possibly remain in place for a rather
long period until full-pledged protection for private property is established. In addition,
judicial reform, by nature, should be best focused on the creating of politically independent,
difficult-to-intimate judges, and this can only be accomplished within the context of social
responsibility. Given the nature of China’s transitional political structure, it has a long
way to go before true judicial independence is established. Nevertheless, it is still possible
to establish a judiciary which is keen on providing equal protection to both state and
private property, as social ideology is indeed diminishing due to recent reform movements
initiated by the Chinese Communist Party with regard to SOEs and state-own assets.

D. SOE Reform, Privatization, and Good Corporate Governance
It is repeatedly emphasized that a well-functioning stock market depends on two
factors: a reasonably accurate information disclosure system and good corporate
governance structure. Corporate governance is centered on the idea that companies are
governed with the aim of providing investors with a reasonable financial return and
operators of the companies, acting within institutional constrains, manage them with
integrity and responsibility.
Since corporate governance became a high profile issue at the end of the 1990s,
China has made important strides attacking the problems during the last few years. As
mentioned earlier, the root of poor corporate governance lies in the intrinsic flaws of the
SOEs management system, stemming from their complex, multi-layer ownership and
control structures, dominating corporate management and shunning protection to minority
shareholders, conflicting objectives, as well as from the ambiguous identity of the state as
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an owner (shareholder) and regulator. To enhance corporate governance, there is no
alternative to the reform of SOEs.
For a long period in the reform era, the officially proclaimed guideline of China’
SOEs reform was “separating State ownership from corporate management”, with the
intention to preserve state dominance and government control in the national economy.231
According to the blueprint on SOEs reform issued by the ruling party, the SOE managers
should not be ideologically and politically qualified, be law-abiding, and have a deep sense
of responsibility. In addition, they should be familiar with the business they engage in and
armed with modern knowledge of business management and even finance, science and
technology, and laws.232 Indeed, the party was seeking angels falling to Earth (specifically
China) from Heaven. However, in many cases the quality of the persons they appointed
fell far short, as evidenced by the numerous cases concerning management corruption and
embezzlement of corporate property (thus causing the loss of asset in listed companies).
Agency problems lead to heavy loss of the wealth of both the state and domestic and
foreign investors.233 With the retreat of the State from management of enterprises, the
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State supervision of the management withdraws as well. Some managers have treated
State assets like their own private property. Corruption thus rampantly emerged and
received incentives from the absence of an effective ultimate owner. Obviously, the major
problems are caused by the ambiguity of the state-enterprise property relationship. Clear
ownership rights are fundamental to the market economy. It can provide important
incentives to use assets productively. As Demsetz so stated, “property rights derive their
significance from the fact that they help a man form those expectations which he can
reasonably hold in dealing with others. Without those expectations, people are unable to
predict whether they will have a given set of assets at their disposal and are thus less likely
to make the most efficient use of those assets. At a minimum, then, a system must parcel
out some (or most) of the constituent rights of ownership into a bundle of rights which are
clearly defined and legally protected.” 234 However, clear ownership by itself is not
sufficient for establishing good corporate governance. Insofar as ownership is concerned,
an enterprise has what are known as “residual risk holders”. In order for these risk holders
to be willing to accept risk, they must (1) be compensated for holding that risk by being the
owner (and therefore having control over the enterprise's operations and profit and loss
distribution) or (2) be able to escape the risk by selling the right to hold it. The existence
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of either of these two conditions could lead to that the owners of the enterprise behave
efficiently.235
Under the ownership structure of SOEs, the State legally owns all the assets of
SOEs, and SOE managers are entrusted by the State to operate the enterprise. This
formula, however, rarely has the chance to achieve success. First, the managers have no or
little incentive to behave efficiently and to make profits for the enterprise because, at least
literally under China’s current employment system, a manager’s compensation has little to
do with his/her performance in managing the company. Second, the managers have no or
little responsibility for the failure or loss of profit of the company because the current
system does not pursue a manager’s personal liability in case of failure of a company. In
fact, it is neither feasible nor fair to place such a heavy liability on managers given the low
pay they receive as opposed to the normal income of private owners of enterprises. The
managers must be subject to effective external supervisions. In a free economy, the
shareholders are responsible for selecting managers of a company and those managers are
accountable to them. This formula, however, does not currently work in China, partly
because the State is not well equipped with the necessary capability to supervise the
management of every company, and partly because minority shareholders otherwise than
the State are somehow consciously excluded from supervising management.
The key to solving this dilemma is to gradually privatize the SOEs and relinquish
government control over them. In a society based on private ownership, misappropriation
of corporate assets seldom happens, and the corporate managers have both the financial
and personal incentives to behave efficiently. The Chinese government and the ruling
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party CCP have realized that the privatization approach might be their last but nevertheless
the best resort to solve the SOE problems. On the 4th Plenum of the 15th CPC Central
Committee on September 22, 1999, the CPC issued the Decisions on Major Issues
Concerning the Reform and Development of State-Owned Enterprise, which, though does
not contain the word “privatization”, implied the Party’s strong interest in this regard.
According to the 1999 Decisions, the State will control only those industries relating to
national security, public utility and natural monopolies, while withdrawing from other
commercial industries. It also calls for the development of non-public ownership that
refers to the de facto private sector. More revolutionary was that it allows the transfer of
small and medium-sized SOEs (SMEs) to private citizens through merger, leasing, or sales.
Finally, it mandates that failed SOEs must be diminished through bankruptcy and closure.
A much bolder move (called as “radical break” by the Washington Post236) has been taken
in October 2003. In the “third plenum” meeting of the Communist Party’s Central
Committee, the ruling party passed a resolution with the most explicit language ever
regarding opening greater door to private business. 237 Significant to the reform of SOEs
and the development of capital markets are two decisions that are likely to fundamentally
change the landscape of China’s corporate ownership structure. First, the socialist
ideology on ownership should be virtually diminished. In addition to the call to give
private business equal treatment and legal protection, it redefines “socialist public
ownership” as “shareholders’ ownership” (Gufenzhi), saying this is the primary form of
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public ownership. It also calls for a “mixed ownership” (hunhe suoyouzhi) which is
characterized as owned by “diversified owners” (duoyuanhuo touzi zhuti) who can trade
their ownership in a property market according to the “modern property system” (xiandai
chanquan zhidu) proposed by the Decisions.238 Affirming the previously established
principle that state ownership shall exist only in areas that “are vital to national security
and economic lifelines, the Decisions explicitly permit private capital to invest in the areas
of infrastructure, utilities, and other industries so long as no law prohibitsit s entry.239 The
implication is that not only state-owned SMEs can be privatized, big SOEs, especially
those under the direct control of the central government, could also be sold to the private
sector through “corporatization”.240 The second significant aspect is that it clarifies the
different roles of the state as shareholder and regulator. The recently established Stateowned Asset Supervision and Administration Commission (SASAC) is authorized to
perform the function of the state owner, representing the state as shareholder in a company.
Furthermore, the Decisions provide that the law should safeguard “the equal legal status
and development rights” of all market participants, including the state owner.241
Conceivably, government agencies with regulatory powers like the CSRC should act only
as regulators, treating public and private owners equally.
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As stressed by Wu Jinglian, effective corporate governance for China’s listed
companies could be established only after the predominance of state ownership is
eliminated.242 The CCP Decisions 2003 certainly attempts to solve the problem. The
prospect is bright in the sense that the major obstacle in the past was the socialist ideology
thatmandated state ownership as a “forbidden area”, untouchable to the private sectors.
To confirm this, the Minister of the SASAC stated recently that “very, very few
enterprises” would remain wholly state-owned and predicted the country would enter a
“peak period of mergers and acquisitions” because his agency and local governments have
been granted the authority to dispose of SOEs.243 Apparently, orthodox socialism is going
to leave China very soon as the wave of massprivatization has been heralded.

CONCLUDING REMARKS
International investors play a key role in major world capital markets. China, never
hiding its ambition to make its stock market one of the most successful on the globe, has
recognized this in recent years. To turn recognition into results, China has taken a variety
of measures, featured with fancy terms such as B shares, QFII, and M&A, to attract
international portfolio investment. It had advanced very cautiously until very recently in
2003, when it opened the door of the stock market boldly and widely to foreigners as well
242
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as to domestic citizens. The objective is clear: China is seen as striving to swallow more
global capital to excite its domestic market and to finance and privatize its ailing SOEs.
To achieve this objective, the key is to enhance the regulatory framework which,
based on rule of law, can provide institutions supporting the market. During the past two
decades, Chinese authorities have been promoting a more effective legal and regulatory
framework for the market and the nation’s corporate sector. It is fair to acknowledge that
important legal reforms have led to clearer rules for the transactional and contractual
relationship, greater enterprise autonomy, and better corporate structures according to
company laws. However, certain structural flaws remain. Due to the absence of liberal
ownership ideology and effective institutions, China’s stock market is suffering from overreaching regulations, under-enforcement of laws, swaying regulatory culture, massive
market manipulation and insider trading, as well as poor corporate governance and little
minority investor protection. The root to all the major problems is the SOEs.
Predominance of the state shareholder in listed companies and less clear identity of the
state as shareholder and regulator are the source of the flaws of the market. With those
flaws, it is difficult for the market to attract international and even domestic investors.
To attack the root of the problems, China should strengthen the reform of its
government, differentiating its two roles as assets owner and regulator and establishing a
“Chinese Wall” between both roles. Reforming the regulatory framework should make a
balance between liberalization and stable development by rethinking the role of foreign
investors, drawing on the experience of developed markets as well as of previous financial
crisis. It shall also take effective steps to improve corporate governance of listed
companies. The key to achieve this, however, is reducing the size and influence of SOEs
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in the national economy, namely, privatization. Only through privatization can it produces
sufficient number of efficient and productive market participants. Short of those qualified
participants, China could succeed in developing a viable stock market simply by copying
the system of laws and models which are alleged to be consistent with “international
standard and practice.” In short, the country needs to depoliticize its stock market by
accelerating privatization (through putting state assets for sale) and enhancing protection of
private ownership. Moreover, since stock markets cannot stand alone, reform should also
create a viable general environment that will have appeal to foreign and domestic investors.
According to the World Bank, “this will require a wide range of supporting reforms to
better protect creditors and investors and tighten up disclosure requirements, in addition to
stable macroeconomic policies to raise saving and help develop the institutional investors
need for good corporate governance.”244
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